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Abstract
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or
choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-
making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme,
low-probability risk (like Pascal’s Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical
in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show
that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can cap-
ture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while
avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background un-
certainty about the choiceworthiness of one’s options, many expectation-
maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives
“in a vacuum” become stochastically dominant in virtue of that back-
ground uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dom-
inance will generally not require agents to accept extreme gambles like
Pascal’s Mugging or the St. Petersburg game. The sort of background un-
certainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent
who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total
amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then,
stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under
uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on
such choices than has previously been recognized.
1 Introduction
Given our epistemic limitations, every choice you or I will ever make involves
some degree of risk. Whatever we do, it might turn out that we would have done
better to do something else. If our choices are to be more than mere leaps in
the dark, therefore, we need principles that tell us how to evaluate and compare
risky options.
The standard view in normative decision theory holds that we should rank
options by their expectations. That is, an agent should represent the various
possibilities over which she’s uncertain as each assigning cardinal degrees of
utility or choiceworthiness to each of her options, evaluate each option by taking
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a probability-weighted sum of these values (an expectation), and then choose
the option for which this sum is greatest. Call this view expectationalism.
Expectational reasoning provides seemingly indispensable practical guidance
in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it encounters
serious difficulties in many cases involving extremely large finite or infinite pay-
offs, where it yields conclusions that are either implausible, unhelpful, or both.
For instance, expectationalism implies that: (i) Any positive probability of an
infinite positive or negative payoff, no matter how minuscule, takes precedence
over all finitary considerations (Pascal, 1669). (ii) When two options carry pos-
itive probabilities of infinite payoffs of the same sign (i.e., both positive or both
negative), and zero probability of infinite payoffs of the opposite sign, the two
options are expectationally equivalent, even if one offers a much greater proba-
bility of that infinite payoff than the other (Ha´jek, 2003). (iii) When an option
carries any positive probabilities of both infinite positive and infinite negative
payoffs, its expectation is simply undefined (Bostrom, 2011). (iv) Certain prob-
ability distributions over finite payoffs can, implausibly, yield expectations that
are infinite (as in the St. Petersburg game (Bernoulli, 1738)) or even undefined
(as in the Pasadena game (Nover and Ha´jek, 2004)). (v) Agents can be ratio-
nally required to prefer minuscule probabilities of extremely large finite payoffs
over certainty of a more modest payoff, in cases where that preference seems at
best rationally optional (as in “Pascal’s mugging” (Bostrom, 2009)).
The last of these problem cases, though theoretically the most straightfor-
ward, is particularly practically significant. Real agents who want to do the
most good when they choose a career or donate to charity often face choices
between an option that is fairly likely to do a moderately large amount of good
(e.g., supporting public health initiatives in the developing world or advocating
for the welfare of farm animals) and an option that carries much a smaller prob-
ability of doing a much larger amount of good (e.g., reducing existential risks
to human civilization (Bostrom, 2013) or trying to bring about very long-term
“trajectory changes” (Beckstead, 2013)). Often, na¨ıve application of expecta-
tional reasoning suggests that we are rationally required to pursue projects of
the latter sort rather than the former, even if the probability of having any pos-
itive impact whatsoever is vanishingly small. For instance, based on the fairly
conservative estimate that a future Earth-originating civilization might support
the equivalent of 1052 human lives, Nick Bostrom concludes that, “[e]ven if we
give this allegedly lower bound...a mere 1 per cent chance of being correct...the
expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth
of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion
human lives” (Bostrom, 2013, p. 19). This reasoning seems to imply that we
should, given the choice, pass up opportunities to do enormous amounts of good
or prevent enormous amounts of harm in the present, in order to maximize the
probability of an astronomical long-term payoff, even if the probability that we
succeed in bringing that payoff about is on the order of, say, 10−30—meaning, for
all intents and purposes, no matter how small the probability. Even hardened
utilitarians who think that we should normally do what maximizes expected
welfare are likely to find this conclusion troubling and counterintuitive.
The aim of this paper is to set out an alternative to expectational decision
theory that outperforms it in the set of problem cases just described—but in par-
ticular, with respect to tiny probabilities of astronomical payoffs. Specifically, I
will argue that under plausible epistemic conditions, stochastic dominance rea-
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soning can capture most of the ordinary, plausible implications of expectational
decision theory—far more than has previously been recognized—while avoiding
its pitfalls in the kinds of problem cases described above.
Stochastic dominance is, on its face, an extremely modest principle of choice
under uncertainty, simply formalizing the idea that one ought to prefer a given
probability of a higher-value payoff to the same probability of a lower-value
payoff, all else being equal. The claim that we are rationally required to reject
stochastically dominated options is therefore on a strong a priori footing (con-
siderably stronger, I will argue, than expectationalism). But precisely because
it is so modest, stochastic dominance seems too weak to serve as a general the-
ory of decision-making under uncertainty: It appears to place no constraints on
an agent’s risk attitudes, allowing intuitively irrational extremes of risk-seeking
and risk-aversion.
But in fact, as we will see, stochastic dominance has a previously unrecog-
nized capacity to effectively constrain an agent’s risk attitudes, at least for a
large class of agents. Specifically, when an agent is in a state of sufficient “back-
ground uncertainty” about the choiceworthiness of her options, expectation-
maximizing options that would not stochastically dominate their alternatives
in the absence of background uncertainty can become stochastically dominant
in virtue of that background uncertainty. But even under these conditions,
stochastic dominance permits us to reject the expectation-maximizing option in
“Pascalian” choice situations where the balance of expectations is determined
by extremely improbable payoffs (whose total probability falls below a threshold
determined by other features of the choice situation), however great the magni-
tude of those payoffs. Thus, stochastic dominance draws a principled distinction
between “ordinary” and “Pascalian” gambles, and vindicates our intuition that
we are permitted to decline many gambles of the latter sort, like Pascal’s Mug-
ging or the St. Petersburg game, even when they are expectationally best. Since
it avoids these and other pitfalls of expectational reasoning, if stochastic dom-
inance can also place plausible constraints on our risk attitudes and thereby
recover the desirable implications of expectationalism, it may provide a more
attractive general theory of rational choice under uncertainty.
I begin in §2 by introducing some conceptual and formal apparatus. In §3,
I say a little more about standard expectational decision theory, as motivation
and point of departure for my main line of argument. §4 introduces stochas-
tic dominance and describes the standard arguments for rejecting stochastically
dominated options as a necessary but insufficient condition of rationality. In
§5, I establish two central results: (i) under sufficient background uncertainty,
the expectationally best option in a given choice situation will often stochasti-
cally dominate its alternatives, even when it is not stochastically dominant in
the absence of background uncertainty; and (ii) as gambles become increasingly
Pascalian (offering smaller probabilities of larger payoffs, while holding the ex-
pected value of the payoffs constant), the first result will eventually fail, so that
stochastic dominance draws a line between “ordinary” gambles (involving sub-
stantial probabilities of a moderate payoffs) and Pascalian gambles (involving
minuscule probabilities of astronomical payoffs). In §6, I argue that the sort of
background uncertainty on which these results depend is rationally appropriate
at least for any agent who assign normative weight to aggregative consequen-
tialist considerations, i.e., who measure the choiceworthiness of her options at
least in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. §7 offers an
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intuitive defense of the initially implausible conclusion that an agent’s back-
ground uncertainty can make a difference to what she is rationally required to
do. §8 describes two modest conclusions we might draw from the preceding ar-
guments, short of embracing stochastic dominance as a general decision theory.
In §9, however, I survey some additional advantages of stochastic dominance
over expectational reasoning and argue that, insofar as stochastic dominance
can recover plausible constraints on risk attitudes and hence capture the intu-
itively desirable implications of expectationalism, we have substantial reason to
prefer it as a general theory of rational choice under uncertainty. §10 is the
conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
Practical rationality (hereafter, “rationality”) involves responding correctly to
one’s beliefs about practical reasons.1 Following others in the recent literature
(e.g. Wedgwood (2013, 2017), Lazar (2017b), MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming)),
I will speak of the total, all-things-considered strength of an agent’s reasons for
or against choosing a particular option as the choiceworthiness of that option.
Reasons and choiceworthiness, in the sense we’re concerned with, are objective in
the sense of being “fact-relative” rather than “belief-relative” (Parfit, 2011)—
e.g., the fact that my glass is poisoned will usually give me a reason against
drinking from it, and thereby make the option of drinking less choiceworthy, even
if I neither believe nor have any evidence that it is poisoned. I take no stance
on whether an option’s choiceworthiness depends on the agent’s motivational
states (desires, preferences, etc.), on acts of will (e.g. willing certain ends for
herself), or on external normative/evaluative features of the world (e.g. universal
moral obligations). In other words, choiceworthiness is objective in the sense of
being belief -independent, but may or may not be objective in the sense of being
desire- or preference-independent.2
Any expectational decision theory must assume that degrees of choicewor-
thiness or utility can be represented on an interval scale (i.e., can be given a
real-valued representation that is unique up to positive affine transformation),
and I will adopt this assumption as well (except briefly in §9): Although stochas-
tic dominance itself is only sensitive to ordinal choiceworthiness relations, the
main line of argument I advance in this paper assumes that choiceworthiness is
amenable to a certain kind of cardinal representation. I remain neutral, though,
on whether cardinal choiceworthiness values should be understood as primitive
or as representations of an underlying ordinal relation.
Let’s now introduce some formal apparatus. A choice situation is an ordered
triple S = 〈A,O, β〉, where A is an agent, O is a set of options {O1, O2, ..., Om},
and β is a probability density function (PDF) over the real numbers that repre-
1I don’t claim that this is all there is to practical rationality—some rational requirements,
like the requirement against forming inconsistent intentions, may have a different source. But
the decision-theoretic aspect of practical rationality with which I am concerned in this paper
does, I assume, consist in responding correctly to reason-beliefs.
2I use the term “choiceworthiness” rather than “value” or “utility” to avoid two possible
confusions: (i) “Value” suggest an evaluative rather than a normative property of options. (ii)
“Utility” is often understood as a measure of preference satisfaction, while I wish to remain
neutral on whether or to what extent an agent’s reasons depend on her preferences.
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sents the agent’s background uncertainty in S.3 We identify each option Oi ∈ O
with its simple prospect, a finite set of ordered pairs Oi = {〈vi1, pi1〉, 〈vi2, pi2〉, ...,
〈vin, pin〉}, where vij ∈ R is a possible simple payoff and pij ∈ (0, 1] is the proba-
bility of obtaining that simple payoff associated with Oi. (I will generally omit
the superscripts on payoffs and probabilities, where there is no risk of confu-
sion.) The pj are all positive (i.e., we ignore simple payoffs with probability 0)
and sum to 1.4
I remain neutral on the interpretation of these probabilities, in two ways.
First, I leave it unspecified whether pij represents the causal probability Pr(Oi →
vij) or the conditional probability Pr(v
i
j |Oi), and hence remain neutral between
causal and evidential decision theory. Second, I leave it unspecified whether
these probabilities are subjective or epistemic.
Intuitively, the simple payoff of an option is what the option itself yields.
The crucial assumption that drives main argument of this paper, however, is
that the overall payoff of an option depends not just on its simple payoff, but
also on what the agent starts off with—what I will call her background payoff.
To illustrate this idea: Suppose that a young person is deciding how to invest
some money in her retirement account, and that her only concern in this context
is her net worth when she retires at age 65. Her options are various funds that
she might invest in. The simple payoff of buying some shares in fund Fi (call
this option Oi) is the value those shares will have when she reaches retirement.
But the overall payoff of Oi—the thing the agent ultimately cares about—is her
total net worth at retirement, if she now invests in Fi. This overall payoff is the
sum of her simple payoff (the future value of her shares in Fi) plus a background
payoff (the value of all her other assets).
Just as an agent may be uncertain about an option’s simple payoffs (e.g.,
how much some number of shares in Fi will be worth in 40 years), she may
also be uncertain about her background payoff (e.g., what her net worth will
be in 40 years, excluding her present investment). This second sort of uncer-
tainty is what I will call background uncertainty. The defining characteristic
of background payoffs and hence of background uncertainty is that they are
independent of other features of the choice situation: In particular, A’s back-
ground payoff in S is independent of (i) which option she chooses and (ii) which
simple payoff she receives from her chosen option. Thus, A’s background uncer-
tainty captures uncertainties that apply to all the options in situation S, rather
than uncertainties about any one option in particular. We will represent A’s
background uncertainty as a continuous random variable with the probability
density function β, such that the probability of a background payoff in the in-
terval [n,m] (for n < m) is given by the integral
∫m
n
β(x)dx. (Again, these
probabilities can be interpreted as either causal or evidential, and as either sub-
jective or epistemic. The stipulation that background payoffs are independent
of which option the agent chooses and of what simple payoff it yields means that
3I restrict my attention in this paper to situations where an agent can assign precise
probabilities to all relevant possibilities. Since there is little possibility of confusion, therefore,
I will speak interchangeably of “risk” and “uncertainty,” setting aside the familiar distinction
due to Knight (1921). I will mainly use the word “uncertainty,” and in particular choose the
term “background uncertainty” rather than “background risk,” partly in order to avoid the
misleading negative connotations of “risk.”
4To avoid unnecessary formal complications, I consider only cases where the number of
possible simple payoffs is finite (except briefly when I discuss the St. Petersburg and Pasadena
games in §9). Nothing of substance will depend on this, as far as I can see.
5
they are probabilisticalaly independent in terms of the decision-relevant proba-
bilities, whatever those may be.) The probability distribution over background
payoffs described by the PDF β is A’s background prospect in S.
Why might an agent be in a state of background uncertainty about the
choiceworthiness of her options? I have already mentioned one possible source of
background uncertainty in the case of financial decision-making, but my primary
focus in this paper will be on another: I will assume that agents should assign
at least some normative weight to aggregative consequentialist considerations,
i.e., that they should measure the choiceworthiness of any option at least in part
by the total amount of value in the resulting world. “Value” is an axiological
property of worlds or states of affairs, rather than a normative property of
practical options; but if the consequences of our actions matter normatively,
then the choiceworthiness of a practical option will be at least partly determined
by the value or disvalue that results from it. If an agent believes that the
choiceworthiness of her options is determined in part by the total value of the
resulting world, then she will generally be in a state of background uncertainty
about the value of her options, because she will generally be uncertain how
much value there is in the world to begin with, independent of her present choice.
When this is the source of an agent’s background uncertainty, we can understand
the function β as giving the probability that, setting aside the outcome of A’s
present choice, the world contains value equivalent to at least n and no more
than m units of choiceworthiness, via the integral
∫m
n
β(x)dx.
It may seem that this sort of uncertainty has no bearing on what an agent
ought to do, since it has no bearing on the relative choiceworthiness of her
options. In the following sections, however, I will make the case that background
uncertainty can have a great deal of practical significance, and so needs to be
included in our representation of choice situations.
The payoff of an option Oi is simply the degree of objective choiceworthiness
that Oi in fact has, or would turn out to have if A were to choose it. This is
determined by both the simple payoff and the background payoff that A would
receive if she chose Oi. More specifically, I will assume that an option’s payoff
can be represented as the sum of its constituent simple and background payoffs—
i.e., that there is some way of assigning real numbers to simple and background
payoffs such that one overall payoff is at least as good as another if and only if
the sum of the real numbers assigned to its constituent simple and background
payoffs is at least as great. Call this additive separability between simple and
background payoffs.
Additive separability is not as strong as it might sound, and in particular,
does not require us to assume that payoffs have any primitive cardinal structure.
Suppose that there is a set S of possible simple payoffs and a set B of possible
background payoffs, and that the set of possible overall payoffs S ×B is totally
preordered by a relation p. Then additive separability amounts to the assump-
tion that 〈S,B,p〉 form an additive conjoint structure. This involves satisfying
a number of (purely ordinal) axioms, of which the most important is an ordinal
separability condition to the effect that, if we know that two overall payoffs
pi and pj have one component in common (i.e., involve the same simple back-
ground payoff or the same background payoff), we can learn whether pi p pj
by learning the distinctive component of each payoff.5 If an additively sepa-
5The other axioms that characterize additive conjoint structures are mainly technical—e.g.
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rable representation of payoffs exists, then it is relevantly unique—specifically,
unique up to a choice of zero elements in S and B and a choice of unit element
in either S or B. Thus, the real numbers used to designate simple, background,
and overall payoffs can be understood either as given independently (e.g., by
purely ethical considerations) or as representing an underlying ordinal relation
on overall payoffs, construed as ordered pairs of simple and background payoffs.
The prospect of Oi is a probability distribution representing the proba-
bility that Oi yields a given (overall) payoff. Given the assumptions of in-
dependence and additive separability, we can express the prospect of Oi as
follows: Where Oi’s simple prospect is given by {〈v1, p1〉, 〈v2, p2〉, ..., 〈vn, pn〉}
and A’s background uncertainty is given by β, the prospect of Oi is given by
βi(x) = p1β(x− v1) + p2β(x− v2) + ...+ pnβ(x− vn).6
There are, then, two substantive assumptions built into my formal frame-
work: (i) independence of background prospects (from simple prospects and
from the agent’s choice) and (ii) additive separability of simple and background
payoffs. The general phenomenon that I will describe in this paper, of back-
ground uncertainty generating new stochastic dominance relations among op-
tions, can survive at least some weakening of these assumptions, and I hope
to show in future work that they can be weakened a great deal. But, as we
will see, there is more than enough to be said within the framework of these
assumptions to keep us busy for one paper. And, as I will argue in §6, both
assumptions are extremely plausible at least for agents who attach normative
weight to aggregative consequentialist considerations.
3 Expectationalism
3.1 Two kinds of expectationalism
Before embarking on my main line of argument, I should say a little more about
expectational decision theory, which I take as my point of departure. In particu-
lar, it’s useful to distinguish two very different versions of expectational decision
theory. One view, which I will call primitive expectationalism, holds that car-
dinal degrees of choiceworthiness are specified independently of decision theory,
e.g., by purely ethical criteria.7 More specifically, cardinal degrees of choicewor-
thiness are specified independently of any ranking of prospects or options under
uncertainty. Primitive expectationalism then holds that agents should maxi-
mize the expectation of these independently specified values. Another view,
(i) requiring that the sets S and B are sufficiently rich that for any si, sj ∈ S, bk ∈ B there
is a bl ∈ B such that 〈si, bk〉 ∼p 〈sj , bl〉, and (ii) requiring that no payoff is infinitely better
than another, in the sense that we can always “get from” one payoff to another by repeatedly
substituting a more preferred component for a less preferred component (e.g., repeatedly
substituting si for sj , where ∀b ∈ B(〈si, b〉 p 〈sj , b〉), to create an ascending series of overall
payoffs), in a finite number of steps. For a full characterization of additive conjoint structures
and a proof that all such structures have an additively separable representation, see Krantz
et al. (1971, pp. 245-266).
6Formally, βi(x) is a mixture distribution, a convex combination of n copies of the back-
ground prospect β, each corresponding to a possible simple payoff 〈vi, pi〉, and therefore
translated along the x axis by the value of that simple payoff (vi) and weighted by the prob-
ability of receiving that simple payoff (pi). Since the pi sum to 1, βi is a probability density
function.
7For one recent example of how this can be done, see Skyrms and Narens (forthcoming).
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which I will call axiomatic expectationalism, holds that cardinal choiceworthi-
ness is simply a representation of some ranking of uncertain prospects (e.g.,
an agent’s preference ordering). This ranking is required to satisfy some set of
axioms guaranteeing that it can be accurately represented as maximizing the
expectation of some assignment of cardinal values to outcomes or options under
certainty.
3.2 Arguments for expectationalism
There are two standard justifications for expectationalism, corresponding to
primitive and axiomatic expectationalism respectively: long-run arguments and
representation theorems.
Long-run arguments invoke the law of large numbers which implies that, as
the length of a series of probabilistically independent risky choices goes to infin-
ity, the probability that an expectation-maximizing decision rule will outperform
any given alternative converges to certainty (Feller, 1968). If successful, long-
run arguments justify a version primitive expectationalism: Their conclusion is
that the agent should maximize the expectation of a cardinal choiceworthiness
function whose values to not represent or depend on the agent’s antecedently
specified preferences toward risky prospects. There is an extensive literature
on long-run arguments, but the general consensus is that they are unsuccessful.
(For one recent treatment, see Buchak (2013, pp. 212–8).) Among other objec-
tions, it’s unclear what force long-run arguments have for agents who don’t in
fact face the relevant sort of long run. And since the standard long-run argu-
ments presuppose an infinitely long run of independent gambles, it’s therefore
unclear what force they have for any actual agent, who will face only a finite
series of choices in her lifetime.
Thus, the standard argument for expectationalism in contemporary decision
theory is based on representation theorems. Representation theorems in decision
theory show that, if an agent’s preferences satisfy certain putative consistency
constraints, then there is some assignment of cardinal values to outcomes (a util-
ity function) such that the agent can be accurately represented as maximizing its
expectation. The standard representation theorems, importantly, can only be
used to justify what I have called “axiomatic expectationalism,” even if we as-
sume the existence of an independently specified, pre-decision-theoretic cardinal
choiceworthiness scale. That is, suppose that an agent accepts some assignment
of cardinal choiceworthiness values to payoffs or options under certainty, but
does not yet know how to rank risky prospects.8 If she is then told that she
must rank prospects in a way that satisfies, say, the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms, this does not imply that she must rank prospects according to their ex-
pectations, as calculated from her original cardinal choiceworthiness function.
Rather, it merely implies that she must rank prospects in a way that can be
represented as maximizing the expectation of some utility function that is an
increasing (i.e., positive monotonic) transformation of her original choiceworthi-
ness function. This permits rankings that are, relative to that original function,
extremely risk-averse or risk-seeking (as I will shortly illustrate).
8Some proponents of axiomatic expectationalism will claim that the idea of a cardinal
choiceworthiness assignment is only intelligible when it is understood as representing an-
tecedently specified preferences over risky prospects. But I assume for purposes of the illus-
tration that primitive cardinal choiceworthiness is at least intelligible.
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The two best-known representation theorems for expected utility theory are
due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954) respectively. I
will focus the von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) axiomatization as representa-
tive of axiomatic expectationalism generally. This lets us avoid the distracting
complication that, in the Savage framework, probabilities cannot be taken for
granted, but are (like cardinal utilities) treated as a derived representation of
the agent’s preferences over lotteries. As far as I can see, though, nothing I say
about axiomatic expectationalism will ultimately depend on any special features
of the VNM framework.
The distinction between primitive and axiomatic expectationalism is impor-
tant because the arguments I advance in this paper will interact differently with
each view. Specifically: I will argue that stochastic dominance on its own can
provide an adequate theory of decision-making under uncertainty. This view
is a rival to both primitive and axiomatic expectationalism. But while, as will
become clear, we cannot capture any of the advantages of the view I describe
without giving up primitive expectationalism (and, therefore, giving up the
hypothetical long-run arguments that support it), we can capture some of its
advantages without giving up axiomatic expectationalism. There is substantial
philosophical skepticism about each of the standard axioms of expected utility
theory, and about the axiomatic approach more generally, and so I will claim as
an advantage of my view that it can recover substantive decision-theoretic con-
clusions from a stronger a priori foundation (viz., stochastic dominance).9 But
my aim in this paper is not to offer any novel criticism of the standard axioms,
and the core argument of the paper will not depend on rejecting any of these
axioms. Rather, as we will see in §8.2, for those who are inclined to accept the
standard axioms, the arguments I present in this paper can be understood as an
“add-on” to standard axiomatic decision theory, deriving intuitively desirable
decision-theoretic conclusions that are compatible with but do not follow from
the standard axioms.
3.3 Expectationalism and risk attitudes toward objective
value
My main interest in this paper is in what risk attitudes we should should adopt
toward objective goods that have some natural cardinal structure—for instance,
towards lives saved or lost. And the two versions of expectationalism have very
different things to say about this question. Primitive expectationalism implies
that, insofar as the choiceworthiness of an option increases linearly with the
quantity of objective value it produces, we should be exactly risk-neutral with
respect to objective goods. But axiomatic expectationalism does not have this
implication.
For instance, consider the “Pascalian” conclusion imputed to expectational-
ism in the §1 that, if there is even a one percent chance that a future Earth-
originating civilization will reach the scale of supporting 1052 happy lives, then
the “the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one
percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human
lives” (Bostrom, 2013, p. 19). Primitive expectationalism supports this sort of
9For a survey of objections to the standard axioms, see §3 of Briggs (2017). For a recent
criticism of the axiomatic approach more generally, see Meacham and Weisberg (2011).
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reasoning, given the natural antecedent specification of the cardinal choicewor-
thiness of payoffs or acts under certainty. Axiomatic expectationalism, on the
other hand, does not support this kind of reasoning—but only because it places
no constraints at all on an agent’s risk attitudes toward any particular good
like lives saved or lost. If an agent satisfies the VNM axioms, then she can be
represented as maximizing the expectation of some utility function, but (unlike
for primitive expectationalism) the function whose expectation she maximizes
need not bear any resemble to any objective value or choiceworthiness function.
To put the point a bit more precisely: Suppose you are in a situation where
the lives of some set of people are at risk. Suppose that the only thing you care
about in this situation is saving lives, that you always prefer saving more lives
to saving fewer, and that you value all the lives at stake equally in the sense that
for any two of the people at risk, all else being equal, you would be indifferent
between saving one or saving the other. Even given these assumptions, the VNM
axioms do not imply, for instance, that you should prefer an option that saves
3 lives with probability .5 (and zero lives otherwise) to an option that saves a
single life with certainty. They do not even imply that you should prefer an
option that saves 1000 lives with probability .5 (and zero lives otherwise) to one
that saves 10 lives with probability .51 (and zero lives otherwise). The VNM
axioms do imply, under these assumptions, that you should be maximizing the
expectation of some function that is strictly increasing with respect to lives
saved. But this function can be arbitrarily convex, concave, or otherwise non-
linear—in other words, while you must be risk-neutral with respect to some such
function, you may be as risk-averse or risk-seeking as you wish with respect to
lives saved or lost.
Is this a defect in standard axiomatic decision theory? It’s not obvious.
Some decision theorists will say that it is not the job of decision theory to
say what your risk attitudes should be toward objective goods like lives saved—
rather, that’s a job for ethics, or for some other branch of normative philosophy.
But it’s pretty clearly a job for someone, regardless of where we place it in the
disciplinary org chart: The complete normative theory of decision-making under
uncertainty should tell us that, in a situation where the only thing that matters
is lives saved or lost, and where all the lives at stake have equal and positive
value, one should prefer to save 1000 lives with probability .5 rather than 100
lives with probability .51. So even if these questions are beyond its intended
remit, axiomatic expectationalism seems to be incomplete as a normative theory
of decision-making under uncertainty.
The arguments I will advance in this paper can be understood as aiming
to fill this gap in axiomatic decision theory—and more particularly, to steer a
middle path axiomatic expectationalism, which places no constraints on our risk
attitudes toward objective goods like lives saved, and primitive expectational-
ism, which requires absolute risk neutrality to the point of Pascalian fanaticism.
I will argue that, once background uncertainty is taken into account, we have
conclusive justification to choose the option that maximizes the expectation of
objective goods like lives saved in nearly all cases involving intermediate proba-
bilities, but that this justification need not transfer to cases involving minuscule
probabilities of astronomical gains or losses. And this justification, importantly,
does not require as input any underived assumptions about the agent’s ranking
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of risky prospects.10
In summary, there are two problems for expectationalism that I am hop-
ing to solve: First, neither version of expectationalism offers a very compelling
justification for choosing the option that maximizes the expectation of objec-
tive values in the ordinary cases (involving moderate probabilities) where it
seems clear that this is what we should do. Primitive expectationalism relies on
the dubious appeal to hypothetical long runs, while axiomatic expectationalism
does not attempt to justify this conclusion in the first place. Second, insofar
as expectationalism does offer a justification for maximizing expected value, it
goes too far, committing us to Pascalian fanaticism in cases involving minuscule
probabilities of astronomical payoffs.11 I aim both to provide a stronger justifi-
cation for maximizing the expectation of objective values in ordinary cases, and
in so doing to draw a principled line between those ordinary cases and extreme,
Pascalian cases.
4 Stochastic dominance
We can now formally introduce stochastic dominance. Dominance reasoning in
general is familiar to most philosophers from game-theoretic contexts like the
prisoner’s dilemma: If I am uncertain about the state of the world but know
that in any possible state option O is more choiceworthy than option P , then
O is said to strictly dominate P . If I know that (i) in any possible state, O is
at least as choiceworthy as P and (ii) in some possible state state O is more
choiceworthy, then O is said to weakly dominate P .
Stochastic dominance is a generalization of these statewise dominance re-
lations. Specifically, option O stochastically dominates option P if and only
if
1. For any payoff x, the probability that O yields a payoff at least as good
as x is equal to or greater than the probability that P yields a payoff at
least as good as x, and
2. For some payoff x, the probability that O yields a payoff at least as good
a x is strictly greater than the probability that P yields a payoff at least
as good as x.12
Formally: O sd P ↔ ∀x(
∫∞
x
βo(x) ≥
∫∞
x
βp(x))∧∃x(
∫∞
x
βo(x) >
∫∞
x
βp(x)).
10The results in the coming sections will show that, under sufficient background uncer-
tainty, we are almost always rationally required to choose the option that maximizes expected
choiceworthiness on a particular cardinalization of our choiceworthiness scale—namely, the
cardinalization that satisfies additive separability between simple and background payoffs. It
is not conceptually necessary that this is the same as the cardinalization given by the natural
cardinal structure of the objective values at stake (e.g., lives saved or lost), but it is extremely
plausible, as I will argue in §8.2.
11This is true of primitive expectationalism, and also of the most natural strategy for placing
constraints on risk attitudes toward objective value within the framework of axiomatic decision
theory—namely, an appeal to “aggregation theorems” like that of Harsanyi (1955).
12This relation is sometimes called first-order stochastic dominance, to distinguish it from
weaker, higher-order stochastic dominance relations. (For a survey of these higher-order rela-
tions, see Ch. 3 of Levy (2016).) Since we will only be concerned with first-order stochastic
dominance, I omit the qualifier.
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An illustration: Suppose that I am going to flip a fair coin, and I offer you a
choice of two tickets. The Heads ticket will pay $1 for heads and nothing for tails,
while the Tails ticket will pay $2 for tails and nothing for heads. Assume that
the choiceworthiness of these options is simply determined by your monetary
reward. The Tails ticket neither strictly nor weakly dominates the Heads ticket
because, if the coin lands Heads, the Heads ticket will yield a better payoff.
But the Tails ticket does stochastically dominate the Heads ticket: There are
three possible payoffs, which in ascending order of desirability are: winning
$0, winning $1, and winning $2. The two tickets offer the same probability of a
payoff at least as good as $0, namely 1. Likewise, they offer the same probability
of an payoff at least as good as $1, namely .5. But the Tails ticket offers a greater
probability of a payoff at least as good as $2, namely .5 rather than 0.
Stochastic dominance as a necessary condition of rationality—i.e., the princi-
ple that agents are rationally required to reject stochastically dominated options—
is on a very strong a priori footing, and is almost entirely uncontroversial in
decision theory. Various formal arguments can be given for this requirement.
For instance: (i) If Oi stochastically dominates Oj , then Oi can be made to state-
wise dominate Oj under an appropriate permutation of equiprobable states in
a sufficiently fine-grained partition of the state space (Bader, 2018, p. 500). So
if it is rationally required to reject statewise dominated options, and if what an
agent rationally ought to do only depends on the prospects of her options, not
on which payoff is associated with which state, then it is rationally required to
reject stochastically dominated options as well.13 (ii) A stochastically dominant
option will be preferred to the alternative it dominates by any agent maximiz-
ing the expectation of any function that is strictly increasing with respect to
choiceworthiness, as long as the expectations of that function are well-defined
and finite for all options (Hadar and Russell, 1969, p. 28). (iii) A stochastically
dominated prospect can be transformed into the prospect that stochastically
dominates it by repeated substitution of some probability of a higher-value pay-
off for the same probability of a lower-value payoff. (This is straightforward
when the prospects are discrete and finitely supported, but becomes a bit more
complicated in the context of infinitely supported or continuous prospects.)
This means, among other things, that an agent who always prefers certainty
of a higher-value payoff to certainty of a lower-value payoff and satisfies the
standard Independence axiom will satisfy stochastic dominance.
More informally, it is unclear how one could ever reason one’s way to choos-
ing a stochastically dominated option P over an option O that dominates it.
For any feature of P that one might point to as grounds for choosing it, there
is a persuasive reply: However choiceworthy P might be in virtue of possessing
that feature, O is equally or more likely to be at least that choiceworthy. And
conversely, for any feature of O one might point to as grounds for rejecting
it, there is a persuasive reply: However unchoiceworthy O might be in virtue
13The claim that agents should only care about prospects, and be indifferent to permutations
of equiprobable states, reflects the idea that all normatively significant features of an outcome
are captured by the payoff value assigned to that outcome, so that as a conceptual matter an
agent must be indifferent between receiving a given payoff in one state and receiving the same
payoff in a different state. If, say, I placed greater value on winning $0 with a Heads ticket
than on winning $0 with a Tails ticket in the example above, then this should be reflected in
the values assigned to the payoffs—i.e., the choiceworthiness of each option should depend on
more than its monetary value, in such a way that the Tails ticket would no longer stochastically
dominate the Heads ticket.
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of possessing that feature, P is equally or more likely to be at least that un-
choiceworthy. To say that O stochastically dominates P is in effect to say that
there is no feature of P that can provide a unique justification for choosing it in
preference to O. For reasons like these, the requirement to reject stochastically
dominated options is almost entirely uncontroversial in decision theory.14
In this paper, however, I am interested in stochastic dominance as an alter-
native to expectational reasoning, and hence as not just a necessary but also
a sufficient criterion for rational permissibility. Let’s call this the stochastic
dominance theory of rational choice (SDTR). Where expectationalism asserts
that an option is rationally permissible iff there is no alternative option with
greater expected choiceworthiness, SDTR asserts that an option is rationally
permissible iff there is no option that stochastically dominates it.
What is the relationship between SDTR and expectationalism? In a broad
range of cases, stochastic dominance reasoning is simply a weakening of expec-
tational reasoning: In particular, whenever the expected choiceworthiness of
all options is finite (i.e., neither infinite nor undefined), O stochastically domi-
nates P only if the expected choiceworthiness of O is greater than the expected
choiceworthiness of P . Hence, in these cases, SDTR is more permissive than
expectationalism. But as we will see in §9, there are other circumstances where
SDTR can deliver guidance that expectational reasoning cannot.
Like axiomatic expectationalism, stochastic dominance does not constrain an
agent’s risk attitudes toward objective goods. Thus, like axiomatic expectation-
alism, it is able to reject Pascalian gambles that maximize expected objective
value by offering minuscule probabilities of astronomical payoffs, but only at the
cost of what looks like excessive permissiveness in more ordinary cases. Again,
in a choice situation where all that matters is saving lives, saving more lives
is always better than saving fewer, and all the lives at stake have equal value,
stochastic dominance does not require you to save three lives with probability
.5 rather than one life for sure, or even to save 1000 lives with probability .5
rather than 100 lives with probability .51.15
This means that primitive expectationalism has an apparent advantage over
both axiomatic expectationalism and SDTR: It can explain why, in ordinary
14In particular, it is less controversial than the standard axioms of expected utility theory:
The most widely discussed alternatives to and generalizations of axiomatic expectationalism,
which give up one or more of those standarad axioms (e.g., risk-weighted decision theories like
that advocated by Quiggin (1982) and Buchak (2013)) all satisfy stochastic dominance. In fact,
to my knowledge, no normative decision theories that has been widely discussed in philosophy
or economics violates stochastic dominance. In the domain of descriptive decision theory, the
original version of prospect theory resulted in violations of stochastic dominance, and largely
for that reason was superseded by cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
It is worth reiterating that we have not specified whether the decision-relevant probabilities
are causal or evidential. In some cases (like Newcomb’s problem), a causal decision theorist
will tell you to choose an option that is stochastically dominated in terms of your evidential
probabilities, and an evidential decision theorist tell you to choose an option that is stochas-
tically dominated in terms of your causal probabilities. But both decision theories imply that
you should reject any option that is stochastically dominated in terms of the decision-relevant
probabilities, whatever kind of probabilities those are.
15In fact, under these assumptions, SDTR and axiomatic expectationalism are very closely
related: Given a fixed ordering of payoffs or outcomes, it is possible to prefer an option Oi to
an alternative Oj while satisfying the VNM axioms if and only if Oj does not stochastically
dominateOi (i.e., if and only if SDTR permits you to chooseOi overOj). The difference is that
axiomatic expectationalism imposes global coherence requirements on the agent’s preferences
(e.g., Independence and Continuity) that SDTR does not.
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cases, you ought to maximize the expectation of objective goods like lives saved.
But, I will argue, this advantage is only apparent. Once we include back-
ground uncertainty in our description of choice situations, things change dra-
matically: Given sufficiently background uncertainty, stochastic dominance can
effectively constrain an agent’s risk attitudes with respect to simple prospects,
thereby recovering many of the practical implications of expectational reasoning
that it does not capture in the absence of background uncertainty. In the next
section, we will see how this can happen.
5 Stochastic dominance under background un-
certainty
This section describes the general phenomenon of stochastic dominance con-
straining the agent’s risk attitudes toward simple prospects in the presence of
background uncertainty, and establishes the two central results of the paper.
The first result gives a sufficient condition for stochastic dominance in the pres-
ence of background uncertainty: In effect, for any option O, it establishes an
upper bound in the partial ordering sd on the set of options that do not
stochastically dominate O, and to which O may be permissibly preferred. For
this reason, I will call it the Upper Bound Theorem. The second result gives
a necessary condition for stochastic dominance: It establishes a lower bound in
the partial ordering sd on the set of options that do stochastically dominate
O. So I will call it the Lower Bound Theorem. The first result supports the
claim that, under sufficient background uncertainty, stochastic dominance re-
quires agents to choose options whose simple prospects are expectationally best
in nearly all ordinary (non-Pascalian) choice situations. The second result shows
that, given sufficiently small probabilities of proportionately large payoffs, the
first result eventually breaks, so that SDTR does not require agents to choose
expectation-maximizing simple prospects in Pascalian choice situations.
The crucial condition for these results is the shape of the agent’s background
uncertainty: specifically, the PDF β that describes her background uncertainty
must have exponential or heavier tails and a sufficiently large scale parameter.
A PDF that is supported everywhere on the real number line has exponential or
heavier tails iff it is bounded below in both its left and right tails by some mem-
ber of the Laplace (or double-exponential) family of probability distributions.
The PDF of a Laplace distribution has the form 12ρe
− |x−µ|ρ , where µ is a location
parameter that determines where the distribution is centered, and ρ is a scale
parameter that determines how quickly the tails decay, by uniformly “stretch-
ing” or “contracting” the distribution while otherwise preserving its shape and
central tendencies. We can specify a function in this family, Lµ,ρ, by specifying
values for these two parameters. To say that β is bounded below in the tails
by a member of the Laplace family, and hence has exponential or heavier tails,
is to say that for some values of µ and ρ, ∃x∀y(|y| > |x| → β(y) > Lµ,ρ(y)). I
will abbreviate “exponential- or heavier-tailed” as large-tailed, and say that an
agent with a large-tailed β is in a state of large-tailed background uncertainty.16
16To my knowledge, there is no standard term for distributions with exponential or heavier
tails. It is more common to distinguish heavy-tailed distributions, whose tails are heavier-
than-exponential, rather than exponential-or-heavier. Thus, the distributions I am interested
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While large tails are a sufficient condition for background uncertainty to gen-
erate new stochastic dominance relations among options and hence for stochastic
dominance to place some non-trivial constraints on an agent’s risk attitudes, the
strength of these constraints—i.e., how much of expectational reasoning we are
able to recapture—will also depend on the scale of β. Thus, the results that
follow will be more interesting, the larger one takes the plausible scale of β to be
(though, as we will see, it need not be particularly large to generate fairly strong
results). A central result in this section will be that, if Oi has greater expected
choiceworthiness than Oj , and β has large tails, then either Oi stochastically
dominates Oj or there is some rescaling of β under which Oi stochastically
dominates Oj—that is, if we “stretch” β out far enough on the x axis, without
otherwise changing its shape or central tendencies, Oi will eventually become
stochastically dominant. I will express this somewhat inexactly by saying that
β must have both large tails and a “sufficiently large scale parameter.” This
is inexact because β need not belong to any parameterized family of distribu-
tions, but it is a convenient way of expressing the point that some rescaling
of β can make Oi stochastically dominant over Oj . In §6, I will argue that
large-tailed background uncertainty with a large scale parameter is rationally
appropriate, in particular for agents who assign normative weight to aggregative
consequentialist considerations. For now, I take it for granted.
I begin in §5.1 with an intuitive description of the target phenomena: how
background uncertainty generates new stochastic dominance relations, and why
we should expect it to discriminate between ordinary and Pascalian gambles. In
§§5.3–5.4, I state the Upper and Lower Bound Theorems respectively and draw
out their implications. In §5.5 I will give a toy example that lets us see just how
tightly stochastic dominance plus background uncertainty constrains an agent’s
risk attitudes, with respect to ordinary and Pascalian gambles respectively. Fi-
nally, §5.6 will preempt some potential worries, showing that various unwanted
results do not obtain.
5.1 How background uncertainty generates stochastic dom-
inance
Suppose that A faces a risky option that will save two lives with probability .5,
but cause one death with probability .5. Suppose further that (i) all the lives
at stake have equal and positive value and (ii) A is certain there are no other
normatively relevant considerations (e.g., deontological constraints) that should
in are those that are either exponential-tailed or heavy-tailed.
As we will see, the condition that is actually required for background uncertainty to beget
new stochastic dominance relations among options is somewhat weaker than the “large tails”
condition. As far as I can see, the weakest sufficient condition is that there are some finite
constants a, b, and c, such that ∀x
( ∫ x+a
x β(y)dy∫ x
x−b β(y)dy
≤ c
)
. But I can’t see any realistic condition
in which β would satisfy this condition without having large tails, so we don’t lose much by
focusing on the stronger condition.
For simplicity, the illustrations I offer below will focus on cases where β is continuous,
symmetrical, and unimodal, but these features play no role in the general results I will prove
in this section. A somewhat more important feature of the cases I use for illustration is that
β is bounded above—i.e., that ∃x∀y(β(y) < x). Where this condition is violated the main
results will still hold, but their scope may be significantly constrained, particularly for gambles
involving very small simple payoffs. But I can think of no reason why a realistic background
uncertainty function should not be bounded above.
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influence her choice besides maximizing the number of lives saved. Call this
option the Basic Gamble.
Basic Gamble (B) {〈−1, .5〉, 〈2, .5〉}
Suppose that A’s only other option is what we will call the Null Option.
Null Option (N ) {〈0, 1〉}
Intuitively, the Null Option can be thought of as the option of “doing nothing,”
e.g., standing stock still or otherwise minimizing one’s effects on the world.
In the absence of any background uncertainty, neither of these options is
stochastically dominant: B gives a greater probability of a payoff ≥ 2, but N
gives a greater probability of a payoff ≥ 0.
But now suppose that A is in a state of background uncertainty, described by
a PDF β. N ’s prospect, then, is simply given by βN (x) = β(x). B ’s prospect is
given by βB(x) = .5β(x−2)+ .5β(x+1). Visually, we can think of B’s prospect
as follows (Figs. 1–2): We make two half-sized copies of β, corresponding to the
two possible outcomes of B, each of which has probability .5. We then translate
one of those copies two units to the right (representing a gain of 2, relative to
the background payoff) and the other one unit to the left (representing a loss
of 1, relative to the background payoff). Finally, we add these two half-PDFs
together, obtaining the new PDF βB(x).
This means that, for each possible payoff x, choosing B rather than N makes
both a positive contribution and a negative contribution to the probability of a
payoff greater than or equal to x.
• Positive contribution: If β yields a background payoff greater than or
equal to x − 2, but less than x, and B yields the simple payoff +2, then
B results in a payoff ≥ x when N would have resulted in a payoff < x.
The probability of a background payoff in the interval [x − 2, x) is given
by
∫ x
x−2 β(y)dy, and the probability that B yields a simple payoff of +2 is
.5. Since these probabilities are independent, we can multiply them. So
the possibility of a positive simple payoff from B increases the probability
of an overall payoff ≥ x by .5 ∫ x
x−2 β(y)dy.
• Negative contribution: If β yields a background payoff greater than or
equal to x, but less than x+ 1, and B yields the simple payoff −1, then B
results in a payoff < x when N would have resulted in a payoff ≥ x. The
probability of a background payoff in the interval [x, x + 1) is given by∫ x+1
x
β(y)dy, and the probability that B yields a simple payoff of −1 is .5.
Since these probabilities are independent, we can multiply them. So the
possibility of a negative simple payoff from B decreases the probability of
an overall payoff ≥ x by .5 ∫ x+1
x
β(y)dy.
Thus, B offers a greater probability thanN of a payoff≥ x iff .5 ∫ x
x−2 β(y)dy >
.5
∫ x+1
x
β(y)dy. If this inequality holds for every x, then B stochastically domi-
nates N . Putting this formally (and multiplying both sides of the inequality by
2, to eliminate the coefficients):
∀x
(∫ x
x−2
f (y) dy >
∫ x+1
x
β(y)dy
)
→ B sd N
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If β is unimodal (i.e., strictly decreasing in either direction away from a
central peak), then this condition will be trivially satisfied for values of x in
the right tail: Since β is decreasing in the right tail,
∫ x
x−2 β(y)dy will clearly
be greater than
∫ x+1
x
β(y)dy, being both “wider” and “taller.” The interesting
question is whether it holds in the left tail. A sufficient condition for it to do so
is that the value of β never decreases by more than a factor of 2 in an interval
of length less than or equal to 3: In this case,
∫ x
x−2 β(y)dy must be greater than∫ x+1
x
β(y)dy, since it is twice as “wide” (i.e., the interval [x − 2, x] is twice as
long as the interval [x, x + 1]) and everywhere at least half as “tall” (i.e., the
maximum value of β on the interval [x − 2, x + 1] is no more than twice the
minimum value).
In other words:
∀x∀y
(
|x− y| ≤ 3→ β(x)
β(y)
≤ 2
)
implies that...
∀x
(∫ x
x−2
β(y)dy >
∫ x+1
x
β(y)dy
)
which in turn implies that...
B sd N
What is needed for the first of these conditions to be satisfied is simply that
β has exponential or heavier tails (more specifically, in this case, an exponential
or heavier left tail), and a sufficiently large scale parameter: If a distribution
has exponential or heavier tails, then for any finite interval length l, there is
some finite n such that the value of β never decreases by more than a factor of
n within an interval of length l. And if for l = 3 this factor is greater than 2,
all that’s needed to make it ≤ 2 is that we “stretch” β sufficiently by increasing
its scale parameter, so that its tails decrease more slowly.
If β does have exponential-or-heavier tails and a sufficiently large scale pa-
rameter, then at every point x on the horizontal axis, in going from N to B, we
move more probability mass from the left of that point to the right (increasing
the probability of a payoff ≥ x) than from the right to the left (decreasing the
probability of a payoff ≥ x) (Fig. 2). This can be visualized by representing
each prospect, not with its probability density function, but by the correspond-
ing complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). Where a PDF
βi(x) gives the probability of a random variable i taking a value in the interval
[y, z] via its integral, as
∫ z
y
βi(x)dx, the corresponding cumulative distribution
function (CDF), Bi(x), gives the probability of that random variable taking a
value less than or equal to x: B(x) =
∫ x
−∞ β(y)dy. The CCDF, B¯(x), is the
complement of the CDF: B¯(x) = 1 − B(x). Thus, the CCDF of the prospect
of an option Oi in choice situation S gives the probability that Oi will yield a
payoff strictly greater than x. When prospects are continuous (as we have been
assuming), and hence the probability of a payoff of exactly x is 0, this is equiva-
lent to the probability of a payoff ≥ x. Thus, if the CCDF of the Basic Gamble,
B¯B(x), is everywhere greater than then CCDF of the Null Option, B¯N (x), we
can conclude that the Basic Gamble is stochastically dominant (Figs. 3–5).
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Figure 1: Large-tailed background uncertainty, represented by its PDF; specifi-
cally, a Cauchy distribution with a location parameter of 0 and a scale parameter
of 10. [Blue: β(x) =
(
10pi(1 + ( x10 )
2)
)−1
.]
Figure 2: PDFs representing the prospects of the Null Option (blue) and the
Basic Gamble (red). Purple and orange curves are “half PDFs” representing
the two possible outcomes of the Basic Gamble: They are obtained from the
background distribution β by multiplying its y values by .5 (representing the .5
probabilities of each payoff), then translating the resulting curves by 2 to the
right and 1 to the left, respectively (representing the magnitude of the payoffs).
The overall prospect of the Basic Gamble is then obtained by summing the
orange and purple curves. [Purple: β′(x) = .5β(x + 1). Orange: β′′(x) =
.5β(x− 2). Red: g(x) = β′(x) + β′′(x).]
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Figure 3: CCDF of the background uncertainty/Null Option prospect from Figs.
1–2, giving the total probability of a payoff ≥ x. [Blue: B¯(x) = 1pi tan−1
(
x
10
)
+
.5.]
Figure 4: CCDFs (and “half CCDFs”) corresponding to the PDFs (and “half
PDFs”) in Fig. 2. The blue curve gives the probability that the Null Option
will yield a payoff ≥ x. The red curve gives the probability that the Basic
Gamble will yield a payoff ≥ x. Purple and orange curves again represent the
two possible simple payoffs of the gamble. [Purple: B¯
′
(x) = .5B¯(x+1). Orange:
B¯
′′
(x) = .5B¯(x− 2). Red: G¯(x) = B¯′(x) + B¯′′(x).]
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Figure 5: Closeup of the two CCDFs from Fig. 4. G¯ (red) is everywhere slightly
greater than B¯ (blue), indicating that the Basic Gamble yields a greater prob-
ability of a payoff ≥ x than the Null Option for every x, and hence that it is
stochastically dominant.
5.2 Pascalian gambles
But now suppose that A is faced with a different gamble: Save 2000 lives with
probability .0005, cause one death with probability .5, or have no effect with
probability .4995. Call this gamble Long Shot.
Long Shot (L) {〈−1, .5〉, 〈0, .4995〉, 〈2000, .0005〉}
Notice that the simple prospect of L has the same expected choiceworthiness
as the simple prospect of B, but with a positive simple payoff that is higher-
magnitude and lower-probability.
We just saw that a sufficient condition for B to stochastically dominate N is
that the value of β never decreases by more than a factor of 2 over the interval
[x−2, x+1], for any x. The analogous sufficient condition for L to stochastically
dominate N, however, is that the value of β never decreases by more than a factor
of 2 over the interval [x−2000, x+ 1] (i.e., ∀y∀z(|y−z| ≤ 2001→ β(y)β(z) ≤ 2))—a
much more demanding condition. This at least suggests that, all else being equal
(in particular, differences in expected choiceworthiness being equal), it is harder
for an expectation-maximizing gamble to become stochastically dominant when
it involves smaller probabilities of more extreme payoffs. We will shortly confirm
this suggestion.
5.3 Upper Bound Theorem
We have seen that, in principle, large-tailed background uncertainty can make
expectationally superior options stochastically dominant. But how often will
this actually happen—how narrow are the conditions under which it happens?
In this section, I answer that question by proving a sufficient condition for
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stochastic dominance, that depends only on (i) the expectations of each op-
tion’s simple prospect, (ii) the “Pascalian-ness” of the options (represented by
the range of possible payoffs), and (iii) the scale of β. This means that the
phenomenon we are exploring does not rely on any further special conditions
besides (i)-(iii). Moreover, both the result itself and the toy example in §5.5
will show that, for non-Pascalian gambles, only a very modest degree of expec-
tational superiority and a very modest amount of background uncertainty are
needed for stochastic dominance to obtain.
To state the result, we need to introduce some new expressions.
• pos(Oi) is the probability-weighted sum of positive simple payoffs from
option Oi.
pos(Oi) :=
∑
j:vij>0
vijp
i
j
• neg(Oi) is the probability-weighted sum of negative simple payoffs from
option Oi.
neg(Oi) :=
∑
j:vij>0
|vij |pij
• range(Oi, Oj) gives the range of possible simple payoffs from Oi and Oj .
range(Oi, Oj) := maxk(v
i/j
k )−mink(vi/jk )
• rate(Oi, Oj , β) gives the maximum ratio between values of the background
uncertainty function β, for arguments that differ by no more than range(Oi, Oj).
rate(Oi, Oj , β) := maxx,y:|y|<range(Oi,Oj)
β(x+y)
β(x)
In these terms, we can now state the first main result—a sufficient condition
for stochastic dominance.
Theorem 5.1 (Upper Bound Theorem). For any options Oi, Oj and back-
ground uncertainty function β,
pos(Oi) + neg(Oj)
pos(Oj) + neg(Oi)
> rate(Oi, Oj , β)→ Oi sd Oj
The proof of this result has been consigned to the appendix. But to give
an intuitive summary: For a given x, suppose that β is uniform on the interval
[x+mink(v
i/j
k ), x+maxk(v
i/j
k )]. Then Oi would alter the probability of a payoff
≥ x, relative to the Null Option, by an amount proportionate to pos(Oi) −
neg(Oi): Each potential positive simple payoff v
i
k alters the probability of a
payoff ≥ x by an amount equal to the product of (i) the probability of receiving
that simple payoff (pik) and (ii) the probability of receiving a background payoff
in the interval [x−vik, x), which if β is uniform on that interval, is proportionate
to the magnitude of vik. And the negative simple payoffs of v
i
k decrease the
probability of a payoff ≥ x in the corresponding way. Hence, Oi gives a greater
probability than Oj of a payoff ≥ x iff pos(Oi)− neg(Oi) > pos(Oj)− neg(Oj),
iff
pos(Oi)+neg(Oj)
pos(Oj)+neg(Oi)
> 1.
But of course β cannot be uniform everywhere (and presumably will not be
uniform anywhere), and when it is not uniform on the relevant interval around
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x, the probability of a background payoff in some part of that interval—say,
[x−vik, x)—cannot be treated as proportionate to the length of that subinterval.
This means that the impact of some potential simple payoffs on the probability
of a payoff ≥ x will be “discounted” relative to others. However, this “discount
rate” cannot be more than rate(Oi, Oj , β), since this is the largest ratio by which
the value of β ever decreases within intervals of the relevant size. Hence, even
under the most pessimistic assumptions for Oi (where the factors that count
in its favor, pos(Oi) and neg(Oj) are discounted by the largest possible factor,
rate(Oi, Oj , β), and the factors that count against it are not discounted at all),
Oi is still guaranteed to stochastically dominate Oj as long as
pos(Oi)+neg(Oj)
pos(Oj)+neg(Oi)
>
rate(Oi, Oj , β).
The Upper Bound Theorem tells us a few things:
1. There are, in effect, three factors on which this sufficient condition for
stochastic dominance depends: (i) the “expectational better-ness” of Oi
relative to Oj (as measured by
pos(Oi)+neg(Oj)
pos(Oj)+neg(Oi)
); (ii) the extremity of the
possible simple payoffs of Oi and Oj (as measured by range(Oi, Oj)); and
(iii) the rate at which the tails of β go to zero (as measured, relative to a
given value of range(Oi, Oj), by rate(Oi, Oj , β)).
2. We could measure the third factor, roughly, by T (f) = maxx
β(x+1)
β(x) .
rate(Oi, Oj , β) will ordinarily be somewhat less than T (f)×range(Oi, Oj).
If β has thinner-than-exponential tails, then β(x+1)β(x) has no upper bound
and T (f) is undefined. If β has exponential or heavier tails, then T (f)
is defined and finite. Moreover, as we “stretch” β (increase its scale pa-
rameter), T (f) (and rate(Oi, Oj , β), for any Oi and Oj) converges to 1.
So given a large-tailed β, any expectationally superior option will eventu-
ally become stochastically dominant, if we sufficiently increase the scale
parameter of β.17
3. On the other hand, since β (being a PDF and hence having an integral
of 1) must get arbitrarily close to zero in its tails, as range(Oi, Oj) goes
to infinity, rate(Oi, Oj , β) will go to infinity as well. Hence, if we make
the choice between Oi and Oj sufficiently Pascalian, without changing the
expectational properties of either option (e.g. by increasing the magnitude
and proportionately decreasing the probability of a positive simple payoff
of Oi, or a negative simple payoff of Oj , while adding complementary
probability of a simple payoff of 0), it will eventually cease to be the case
that
pos(Oi)+neg(Oj)
pos(Oj)+neg(Oi)
> rate(Oi, Oj , β). Thus, we can say that at least this
sufficient condition for stochastic dominance draws a distinction between
ordinary and (sufficiently) Pascalian choice situations, requiring agents to
maximize expected choiceworthiness in the former but not in the latter.
In the next section, we will find more definite support for this distinction.
4. Finally, improving the expectational properties of Oi or worsening the ex-
pectational properties of Oj will count in favor of Oi stochastically domi-
nating Oj , by increasing
pos(Oi)+neg(Oj)
pos(Oj)+neg(Oi)
. The effects of this factor require
17For a closely related result, see Theorem 1 in Pomatto et al. (2018).
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a bit more analysis, since it is not always possible to change the expec-
tational properties of Oi/j in the ways we might be interested in without
also changing rate(Oi, Oj , β). So I will return to this point in §5.6, and
show that changing the expectational properties of options affects their
stochastic dominance relations, monotonically, in the ways that we would
intuitively expect.
5.4 Lower Bound Theorem
We now have some suggestion that, in the presence of large-tailed background
uncertainty, stochastic dominance distinguishes between ordinary and Pascalian
choice situations. But we do not yet have any clear proof that this is so. In
this section, I give another result, this time a necessary rather than a sufficient
condition for stochastic dominance, that confirms this suggestion.
Once again, to state the result we must introduce some new expressions:
• prob+(Oj) is the total probability that Oj will yield a positive simple
payoff.
prob+(Oj) :=
∑
i:vji>0
pji
• prob−(Oj) is the total probability that Oj will yield a negative simple
payoff.
prob−(Oj) :=
∑
i:vji<0
pji
• inc(Oj , β, x) is the probability, conditional on choosing Oj , of receiving a
background payoff < x, but also receiving a positive simple payoff from
Oj that results in a total payoff ≥ x. (In other words, inc(Oj , β, x) is the
increment to the probability of a payoff ≥ x provided by Oj).
inc(Oj , β, x) :=
∑
i:vji>0
pji
∫ x
x−vji β(y)dy
• dec(Oj , β, x) is the probability, conditional on choosing Oj , of receiving a
background payoff ≥ x, but also receiving a negative simple payoff from
Oj that results in a total payoff < x. (In other words, dec(Oj , β, x) is the
decrement to the probability of a payoff ≥ x provided by Oj).
dec(Oj , β, x) :=
∑
i:vji ,0
pji
∫ x+|vji |
x
β(y)dy
The necessary condition for stochastic dominance is as follows:
Theorem 5.2 (Lower Bound Theorem). For any options Oj, Oj, and back-
ground uncertainty function β,
Oj sd Ok → ∀x
((
prob+(Oj)
∫ x
−∞
β(y)dy) + (prob−(Ok)
∫ ∞
x
β(y)dy
)
≥ inc(Ok, β, x) + dec(Oj , β, x)
)
Proof. Oj stochastically dominates Ok only if, for every x, Oj gives at least as
great a probability of a payoff ≥ x. We can express this condition as follows:
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Oj sd Ok → ∀x(
∑
i:vji>0
pji
∫ x
x−vji β(y)dy −
∑
i:vji<0
pji
∫ x+|vji |
x
β(y)dy ≥∑
i:vki >0
pki
∫ x
x−vki β(y)dy −
∑
i:vki <0
pki
∫ x+|vki |
x
β(y)dy)
We can express the righthand side of this conditional more simply as:
∀x(inc(Oj , β, x)− dec(Oj , β, x) ≥ inc(Ok, β, x)− dec(Ok, β, x))
This is equivalent to:
∀x(inc(Oj , β, x) + dec(Ok, β, x) ≥ inc(Ok, β, x) + dec(Oj , β, x))
Since increasing the bounds of an integral increases its value, it follows that:
∀x((prob+(Oj)
∫∞
x
β(y)dy)+(prob−(Ok)
∫ x
−∞ β(y)dy) ≥ inc(Oj , β, x)+dec(Ok, β, x))
The Lower Bound Theorem follows immediately from the last two inequali-
ties.
The Lower Bound Theorem has a weaker but more perspicuous corollary:
Corollary 5.2.1 (Weak Lower Bound Theorem). For any options Oj, Oj, and
background uncertainty function β,
Oj sd Ok → prob+(Oj) + prob−(Ok) ≥ max
x
(inc(Ok, β, x) + dec(Oj , β, x))
This follows immediately from the Lower Bound Theorem, given that β is a
PDF and hence that both
∫∞
x
β(y)dy and
∫ x
−∞ β(y)dy must be ≤ 1.
These results tell us two things:
1. In any non-trivial binary choice situation, there is some probability thresh-
old such that sets of simple payoffs with total probability below that
threshold cannot generate stochastic dominance, no matter the magni-
tude of the individual payoffs. More precisely: Suppose A must choose
between Oj and Ok, that Oj is expectationally superior, but that there
is some positive probability of a positive simple payoff from Ok and/or a
negative simple payoff from Oj . Then there is some minimum probability
p such that if prob+(Oj) + prob
−(Ok) < p, then Oj cannot be stochas-
tically dominant, no matter how larger its positive simple payoffs or the
negative simple payoffs of Ok. In other words, whenever there is some
downside to choosing the expectationally superior option Oj , its upsides
must meet some threshold of non-trivial probability in order for stochastic
dominance to require it. In this sense, SDTR provides a principled basis
for declining Pascal’s Mugging and other sufficiently Pascalian gambles.
2. The probability threshold that the Lower Bound Theorem establishes
in a given choice situation, however, is sensitive to inc(Ok, β, x) and
dec(Oj , β, x), which in turn are sensitive to the scale parameter of β.
Since increasing the scale parameter of β spreads its fixed budget of prob-
ability mass more thinly, as the scale parameter of β goes to infinity, the
value of any finitely bounded integral of β goes to zero, meaning that
24
maxx(inc(Ok, β, x) + dec(Oj , β, x)) goes to zero. Thus, the greater the
agent’s background uncertainty (as represented by the scale parameter of
β), the more Pascalian a choice situation can become while preserving
stochastic dominance.
5.5 An illustration
The general results in the last two subsections describe separate sufficient and
necessary conditions for stochastic dominance. If we fill in some details, though,
we can find interesting necessary-and-sufficient conditions for stochastic dom-
inance in particular constrained contexts. This lets us see just how tightly
stochastic dominance constrains risk attitudes in particular choice situations,
both “ordinary” and “Pascalian.”
First, let’s specify A’s background uncertainty: Suppose it is given by a
Laplace distribution with a mean of zero and a scale parameter of − 500ln(.05)
(≈ 166.9).18 A Laplace distribution has two exponential tails, and is therefore
as light in the tails as any class of large-tailed distributions can be. The scale
parameter of − 500ln(.05) is chosen because it yields a 95% confidence interval of
[−500,+500]. If we continue to assume that units represent lives saved/lost (or
more precisely, the choiceworthiness of saving a typical life), then this scale pa-
rameter means the agent is 95% confident that her background payoff will fall
in an interval whose magnitude is the value of 1000 human lives. For an agent
who attaches normative weight to the impartial consequences of her choices, and
for whom background uncertainty reflects uncertainty about the total amount
of value in the universe, this scale parameter is implausibly small. I will argue
in §6 that much greater background uncertainty—both heavier tails and larger
confidence intervals—is warranted. But I assume this extremely modest degree
of background uncertainty in order to emphasize how easily stochastic domi-
nance can generate very strong constraints on an agent’s risk attitudes toward
simple prospects.
How strong are these constraints, then, given the background prospect we’ve
specified? To investigate this, let’s consider the following:
Generalized Basic Gamble (G) {〈−1, .5〉, 〈0, .5− p〉, 〈2, p ∈ [0, .5]〉}
We can interpret G as an action that will save two lives with probability p,
cause one death with probability .5, and have no consequences with probability
.5−p. Given a choice between G and N, G has greater expected choiceworthiness
than N iff p > .25. But for what values of p is G stochastically dominant?
To figure this out, it’s helpful to consider the CDF, B, of the background
prospect. The CDF of a Laplace distribution with a mean of 0 and a scale
parameter of − 500ln(.05) can be expressed as follows:
B(x) =
{
.5 exp( ln(.05)x500 ) x ≤ 0
1− .5 exp(− ln(.05)x500 ) x > 0
18Stochastic dominance is invariant under translations of the agent’s background prospect
(i.e., transformations of the form β′(x) = β(x− a) for some constant a), since translations of
β only result in identical translations of each option’s overall prospect. Thus, in a parameter-
ized distribution like Laplace, the choice of mean (and more generally, the choice of location
parameter) is makes no difference for our purposes.
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For any x, G improves the probability of a payoff ≥ x (relative to N) by
p(B(x)−B(x− 2)), and worsens the probability of a payoff ≥ x (relative to N)
by .5(B(x+ 1)−B(x)). Thus, G stochastically dominates N iff:
∀x(p(B(x)−B(x− 2)) > .5(B(x+ 1)−B(x)))
This is equivalent to:
∀x
(
p >
.5(B(x+ 1)−B(x))
B(x)−B(x− 2)
)
The function on the right side of this inequality is bounded above by a limit
of ∼ .25226, which it approaches as x goes to −∞. This means that, while G has
greater expected choiceworthiness thanN iff p > .25, G stochastically dominates
N iff p > ∼ .25226. So, even given a relatively light-tailed background prospect
with a very small scale parameter, stochastic dominance imposes extremely tight
constraints on the agent’s risk attitudes with respect to the choice between G
and N —nearly as tight as the constraints imposed by expectationalism.
But now consider a generalized version of our high-payoff gamble:
Generalized Long Shot (S) {〈−1, .5〉, 〈0, 1− p〉, 〈2000, p ∈ [0, .5]〉}
S has greater expected choiceworthiness than N iff p > .00025. By reasoning
parallel to the case of G, we conclude that S stochastically dominates N iff:
∀x
(
p >
.5(B(x+ 1)−B(x))
B(x)−B(x− 2000)
)
The function on the right side of this inequality, however, has a least upper
bound of approximately ∼ .0030047. That is, S only comes to stochastically
dominate N when the probability of a positive payoff is more than ten times
greater than the probability at which S becomes expectationally superior. So
at least in these cases, stochastic dominance places very tight constraints on our
risk attitudes regarding intermediate probabilities of modest payoffs, but gives
us much more latitude when faced with very small probabilities of very large
payoffs.19
These results are illustrative, but involve what is probably an unrealistically
small scale parameter. For this reason, and given the more general results in
the preceding sections, it seems to me that the greater worry about stochastic
dominance in the presence of large-tailed background uncertainty is not that
it will capture too little of expectational reasoning (failing to recover intuitive
constraints on our risk attitudes), but rather that it will capture too much—
requiring us to accept many gambles that seem intuitively Pascalian and hence
rationally optional.
19Notably, given that B has exponential or heavier tails, it seems to matter very little
precisely how heavy its tails are. For instance, suppose we replace the Laplace distribution
with a Cauchy distribution—which has much heavier tails—centered at 0 and with a scale
parameter of −500(cot(.525pi)) (≈ 39.35)—which yields the same 95% confidence interval of
[−500,+500]. Now we find that G stochastically dominates N iff p >∼ .25969 (as opposed
to ∼ .25226 for the Laplace distribution), and S stochastically dominates N iff p >∼ .009452
(as opposed to ∼ .0030047 for the Laplace distribution). That is, at least in these two
cases, moving to a much heavier tailed distribution with a roughly equivalent scale parameter
does not change the conditions for stochastic dominance very much, and in fact makes those
conditions somewhat more demanding, rather than less.
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But really, this is not a worry at all: Unlike the a priori case for primi-
tive expectationalism, the a priori case for rejecting stochastically dominated
options is far more epistemically powerful than our intuitions about Pascalian
gambles. If some gambles that intuitively strike us as Pascalian turn out to
stochastically dominate their alternatives once we account for our background
uncertainty, we should not conclude that stochastic dominance is implausibly
strong. Rather, we should conclude that there is a much more compelling ar-
gument for choosing the expectation-maximizing option in these cases than we
had previously realized. This would be not a reductio but rather an unexpected
and practically important discovery.
5.6 Preempting some worries
We have found that, given sufficient background uncertainty, stochastic dom-
inance can capture many of the attractive consequences of expectational rea-
soning, while remaining less prone to Pascalian fanaticism. In §9, I will enu-
merate several more advantages of stochastic dominance over expectational rea-
soning. But we might worry that stochastic dominance will produce uniquely
unattractive consequences, particularly in the presence of background uncer-
tainty (since we’ve now seen that, in this context, stochastic dominance is not
nearly such a meek and retiring decision rule as it first appears). It’s of course
impossible (or at least well beyond the capacity of mere human decision the-
orists) to prove that a decision theory will never have any counterintuitive or
otherwise unattractive implications. But we can at least preempt a few partic-
ularly salient worries.
1. Stochastic dominance is transitive, even in the presence of background
uncertainty. Proof: Let Pr(Oi ≥ x) denote the probability that Oi yields
a payoff equal to or greater than x (i.e., Pr(Oi ≥ x) :=
∫∞
x
βi(y)dy).
Suppose that Oi sd Oj and Oj sd Ok. Then for any x, Pr(Oi ≥
x) ≥ Pr(Oj ≥ x) and Pr(Oj ≥ x) ≥ Pr(Ok ≥ x), and for some x, one
or both of these is a strict inequality. It clearly follows that for any x,
Pr(Oi ≥ x) ≥ Pr(Ok ≥ x), and for some x, Pr(Oi ≥ x) > Pr(Oj ≥ x),
and hence that Oi sd Ok.20
2. If the expectation of the simple prospect of Oi is less than the expectation
of the simple prospect of Oj , then Oi will never stochastically dominate
Oj , even in the presence of background uncertainty (Pomatto et al., 2018,
p. 3).21
20Stochastic dominance is also irreflexive (no option stochastically dominates itself) and
asymmetric (if Oi stochastically dominates Oj , then Oj does not stochastically dominate Oi),
and hence constitutes a strict partial ordering.
21It is possible that, in a given choice situation, Oj will be stochastically dominated and
Oi not, even though Oj ’s simple prospect has a greater expectation. For instance, given a
choice between (O1) 〈1000, 1〉, (O2) a St. Petersburg game, and (O3) St. Petersburg +1, O2 is
stochastically dominated andO1 is not, even though O2 has greater expected choiceworthiness.
But this seems unproblematic; it simply points out the distinction between a ranking of options
and a decision rule. SDTR does not say that O1  O2 in this choice situation. Rather, it gives
the ranking O3  O2, O2/3 ∼ O1, and endorses the decision rule of choosing an option that
is maximal in that ranking (i.e., of rejecting all and only the options that are non-maximal).
This does not amount to claiming that an expectationally worse option is better than an
expectationally better option.
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3. If Oi stochastically dominates Oj in the absence of background uncer-
tainty (i.e., if the simple prospect of Oi stochastically dominates the sim-
ple prospect of Oj), then Oi also stochastically dominates Oj in the pres-
ence of any background uncertainty (given our definitional requirement
that background prospects are independent of simple prospects) (Pomatto
et al., 2018, pp. 2–3).
4. Increasing the value of a possible simple payoff of an option will never
cause that option to fall in the stochastic dominance ordering. Formally:
Suppose Oi has the simple prospect {〈vi1, pi1〉, 〈vi2, pi2〉, ..., 〈vin, pin〉}, and Oj
has the simple prospect {〈vi1 +m, pi1〉, 〈vi2, pi2〉, ..., 〈vin, pin〉}, for some pos-
itive m. Then if Oi stochastically dominates Ok, Oj stochastically domi-
nates Ok. And if Ok stochastically dominates Oj , then Ok stochastically
dominates Oi.
Proof. Case 1: Suppose vi1 is positive. Then, since p1 > 0, m > 0, and
∀x(β(x) > 0), it follows that ∀x(inc(Oj , β, x) > inc(Oi, β, x)). Since the
negative simple payoffs of Oi and Oj are identical, ∀x(dec(Oj , β, x) =
dec(Oi, β, x)). Hence, ∀x(inc(Oj , β, x) − dec(Oj , β, x) > inc(Oi, β, x) −
dec(Oi, β, x)), so Oj stochastically dominates Oi.
Case 2: Suppose vi1 is negative. Then by parallel reasoning it follows
that ∀x(dec(Oj , β, x) < dec(Oi, β, x)). If vi1 + m is also negative, then
∀x(inc(Oj , β, x) = inc(Oi, β, x)). If vi1 +m is positive, ∀x(inc(Oj , β, x) >
inc(Oi, β, x)). Either way ∀x(inc(Oj , β, x)−dec(Oj , β, x) > inc(Oi, β, x)−
dec(Oi, β, x)), so Oj stochastically dominates Oi.
Since stochastic dominance is transitive, it follows from Oj sd Oi that
Oi sd Ok → Oj sd Ok and Ok sd Oj → Ok sd Oi.
This means that, when a Pascalian gamble fails to achieve stochastic dom-
inance in the presence of background uncertainty, this is not because the
potential simple payoff is so large (which can only count in its favor, in
the stochastic dominance ordering), but because the probability of that
simple payoff is so small.
5. Conversely, and by the same reasoning, worsening a possible simple payoff
of an option will never improve that option’s position in the stochastic
dominance ordering.
6. As a simple corollary, shifting probability from a worse simple payoff to a
better simple payoff will never worsen an option’s position in the stochastic
dominance ordering, and shifting probability from a better simple payoff to
a worse simple payoff will never improve its position. Formally: Suppose
Oi has the simple prospect {〈v1, p1〉, 〈v2, p2〉, ..., 〈vn, pn〉}, and Oj has the
simple prospect {〈v1, p1− q〉, 〈v2, p2 + q〉, ..., 〈vn, pn〉}, for some q ∈ (0, p1).
Then if v1 < v2, it follows that if Oi sd Ok → Oj sd Ok and Ok sd
Oj → Ok sd Oi. And if v2 < v1, it follows that Oj sd Ok → Oi sd
Ok and Ok sd Oi → Ok sd Oj . The reasoning here is similar, since
shifting probability from a worse to a better simple payoff is equivalent to
improving a simple payoff.
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6 Sources of background uncertainty
The arguments in the last section are practically significant only if some agents
are (or epistemically ought to be) in a state of background uncertainty described
by a large-tailed probability distribution with at least a moderately large scale
parameter. But is this realistic? In this section, I will offer three arguments for
the claim that, if an agent assigns normative weight to aggregative consequen-
tialist considerations, then this sort of background uncertainty is at least very
reasonable, and plausibly rationally required.
First, an intuitive argument: The level of background uncertainty that the
results of the previous section require is in fact extremely modest. To say that
a distribution is exponential-or-heavier-tailed is just to say, in effect, that there
are finite upper and lower bounds on the ratio between the probabilities as-
signed to the interval [x − 1, x] and the interval [x, x + 1].22 In our context,
this means that there is some finite upper bound on how much more probable
I take it to be that the universe contains between x − 1 and x units of value
than that the universe contains x and x+ 1 units of value, or vice versa, across
all values of x. The only way this could plausibly fail to be true is if the ratio
increased/decreased without bound in one or both tails of my probability distri-
bution. But this implies that I become arbitrarily confident about the relative
plausibility of very similar hypotheses, in a domain where I seem to have vir-
tually no grounds for distinguishing between those hypotheses. It would mean,
for instance, that I find it vastly more probable that the universe contains be-
tween −18, 946, 867, 974, 834 and −18, 946, 867, 974, 835 units of value than that
the universe contains between −18, 946, 867, 974, 835 and −18, 946, 867, 974, 836
units of value. And as the numbers get larger, my relative confidence only gets
(boundlessly) greater.23 But it seems obvious that, if anything, my confidence
in these relative probabilities should diminish as the numbers get larger. None
of my evidence provides any serious support for the first of the above hypotheses
([−...5,−...4]) over the second ([−...6,−...5]), at least not in any way that I am
capable of identifying.
Formalizing this argument a bit, the assumption of large-tailed background
uncertainty is supported by a plausible general condition on credences.
Super-Regularity Given a set S of empirical possibilities arranged in a one-
dimensional metric space by some natural, interval-scale measurable prop-
erty, a rational prior on S must be such that, for any l, the ratio of prob-
abilities assigned to any two contiguous intervals of length l has a finite
upper bound.24
22The constant 1 is arbitrary. If the ratio between the probabilities of [x−a, x] and [x, x+a]
has finite upper and lower bounds for a = 1, it follows that the same is true for any other
finite value of a.
23The alternative is that I assign probability 0 to the universe containing any finite quantity
of value above some finite maximum, and/or to to the universe containing any finite quantity
of value below some finite minimum. It seems obvious to me that this sort of certainty
is unwarranted. Our state of knowledge with respect to the size of the universe (briefly
summarized later in this section) provides sufficient though not necessary support for this
prohibition on certainty. More fundamentally, the assumption that β is positive everywhere
follows from the very modest regularity assumption that we should assign positive probability
to any measurable set in a measurable space of empirical possibilities.
24I restrict this condition to one-dimensional metric spaces to avoid the complications in-
volved in generalizing it to higher dimensions. A plausible generalization, it seems to me, is
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This condition is fairly modest, it seems to me—much more modest, for instance,
than an objective Bayesian principle of indifference. Super-regularity permits
an agent’s prior to be arbitrarily more confident that the total amount of value
in the universe, for instance, is in one finite interval than that it is in an equally
large, adjacent interval. It just doesn’t allow this relative confidence to increase
without limit as we consider pairs of increasingly unlikely hypotheses.
Two auxiliary claims are needed to get from Super-Regularity to the as-
sumption of large-tailed background uncertainty on which the results in §5 de-
pend: First, we must assume that the metric on payoffs that facilitates those
results—viz., the metric that satisfies additive separability between simple and
background payoffs (and which, if it exists, is unique up to positive affine
transformation)—is given by some natural property. This is clearly true in the
context of a normative theory like classical utilitarianism: If, as classical utili-
tarianism assumes, pleasure and pain are natural properties, interval-scale mea-
surable and interpersonally comparable, then total pleasure minus pain provides
a natural metric on any set of empirical possibilities (at least, where this total
is well-defined and finite in each possibility). Second, since Super-Regularity
only states a condition on priors, we must assume that the real-world agents
we’re concerned with (i.e., agents like us) do not have any evidence that would
justify updating from a super-regular prior to a non-super-regular posterior.
Such evidence is conceivable: For instance, I might learn with certainty that
the universe was generated by an objective chance process that generates total
welfare levels from a Gaussian distribution. But as far as I can see, there is no
reason to think that any real-world agent has this sort of evidence.
If super-regularity is a genuine condition on rational priors, then the ar-
gument for large-tailed background uncertainty and hence for the unexpected
power of stochastic dominance applies not just to those who assign norma-
tive weight to aggregative consequentialist considerations, but to any agent for
whom the choiceworthiness of an option depends (to a sufficient degree) on un-
certain empirical conditions. A hedonstic egoist, for instance, if her credences
concerning her future lifetime hedonic utility satisfy super-regularity, will also
find herself in a condition of large-tailed background uncertainty.
The second argument for large-tailed background uncertainty is a bit more
concrete. Assume that the total amount of value in the world is, at least in
part, a function of the total welfare of all morally statused beings.25 In this
case (unless there are axiological/normative considerations that are systemati-
cally anti-correlated with total welfare), my background uncertainty in any given
choice situation will be at least as great as my uncertainty regarding the total
amount of welfare in the universe. This uncertainty is in turn, at the coarsest
level, determined by my uncertainty about (i) the total number of morally stat-
ued beings in the universe and (ii) the average level of welfare across all sentient
that in any natural metric space of empirical possibilities, for convex regions of a specified size
and shape s, the ratio of probabilities assigned to contiguous or overlapping s-regions has a
finite upper bound. But since we are assuming that possible degrees of choiceworthiness are
arranged one-dimensionally on a cardinal scale, the one-dimensional condition is all we need.
25For our purposes, very little depends on the exact criteria for moral status, except that
moral status is not restricted to beings within a particular region of space or period of time.
Thus, the arguments that follow are compatible with any theory of welfare (e.g. hedonism,
preference theories, objective list theories...) and with various theories of moral status, in-
cluding those that attribute status to all sentient beings but also those that restrict status to
beings with characteristics like human-level intelligence or rationality.
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beings.
The most obvious source of exponential or heavier tails is uncertainty about
the number of morally statused beings. Riffing on the famous Drake equation,
we can roughly approximate the number of morally statused beings in the uni-
verse as a product of the following factors:
1. The total number of galaxies (that will ever exist) in the universe26
2. The average number of stars (that will ever exist) per galaxy
3. The average number of populations of morally statused beings per star
4. The average longevity of those populations, in generations
5. The average number of individuals in a generation
Any of factors (1), (4), and (5) might be a source of large-tailed background
uncertainty, but factor (1) is the most straightforward.27 One might think
that (1) is a limiting factor, and in fact shows that our background prospects
should not be unboundedly large-tailed, since there is an upper bound on the
number of galaxies given by the size of the observable universe (thought to
contain between 200 billion and a few trillion galaxies in total (Gott III et al.,
2005; Conselice et al., 2016)). But in fact, it’s well known that the observable
universe is at most a small part of the universe as a whole: Because current
observational data constrain the large-scale curvature of the universe to a fairly
small interval around zero (Gong et al., 2011; Jimenez et al., 2018), the universe
as a whole must be many times larger than the observable universe, and more
importantly, there is no known upper limit on its size, even on the assumption
that it is finite.28 All that is required for a distribution to have large tails is that
there is no value above which probabilities begin to drop off at a faster-than-
exponential rate. And current cosmology seems to provide no epistemic basis for
such a super-exponential dropoff with respect to the number of galaxies in the
universe as a whole.29 Therefore, assuming that the number of morally statused
26I assume here that the aggregative consequentialist considerations to which the agent
assigns normative weight are both spatially and temporally neutral. If these considerations
are “biased toward the future” (Parfit, 1984), assigning diminished or zero weight to events
in an agent’s past light cone (or, given a privileged rest frame, in the objective past), this
would make little difference to my arguments. Likewise, if they incorporate a “pure rate of
time preference” (i.e., a non-instrumental discount rate) with respect to future events, but
give equal weight to all events to which the agent is spacelike related (or that are objectively
present), this would also make little difference. If they incorporate a (non-instrumental) spatial
discount rate, or if assign weight only to events in the agent’s future light cone, this would
pose a problem for my argument, but I take for granted that these forms of non-neutrality
are implausible, at least from an aggregative consequentialist perspective.
27With respect to (4) and (5), it could be that interstellar civilizations are extremely long-
lived, or that they become extremely numerous. Setting aside speculative physics, however,
there seem to be fairly hard upper bounds on both these factors, given by the impending heat
death of the universe and the light-speed limit on a civilization’s rate of expansion.
28Vardanyan et al. (2011) find that, based on current data, the universe must be at least
251 times larger than the observable universe. Based on more theoretical considerations from
inflationary cosmology, Page (2007) suggests a lower bound of roughly 1010
10122
times the size
of the observable universe. To my knowledge, no cosmologist has proposed an upper bound
on the size of the universe as a whole.
29I have set aside, as overkill, various multiverse hypotheses according to which the result
of the Big Bang (our observable universe, and what lies beyond it) is only a small part of the
universe as a whole. But these hypotheses of course add to our uncertainty about the size of
the universe and the total amount of value it contains.
31
beings per galaxy is not (as a matter of subjective or evidential probability)
inversely related to the number of galaxies, there is no support for a faster-than-
exponential dropoff in our probability distribution over the number of morally
statused beings.
Uncertainty about the number of morally statused beings in the universe
gives us one heavy tail, but for the results in the previous section we need two.
To get the second tail, we must appeal to second of the basic factors mentioned
above: uncertainty above the average level of welfare per sentient beings. If
I were certain that this average was positive, then my probability distribution
over possible amounts of (welfarist) value in the universe would be left-bounded
at (or above) zero. And I were certain that the average was negative, then it
would be right-bounded at (or below) zero. I assume, however, that neither of
these certainties is justified.
I won’t try to say what our probability distribution with respect to average
welfare should look like. As with the number of statused beings, a great many
factors contribute to this uncertainty: Which beings do we count as morally
statused (e.g., microorganisms, plants, insects, large animals of less-than-human
intelligence, various types of artificial mind, etc)? What is the correct theory of
welfare (hedonism, preference satisfaction, objective list...)? Given the correct
theory of welfare, what is the average welfare level for various categories of
statused beings (e.g., do insects on average have net positive welfare; or, for
that matter, do human beings on average have net positive welfare)? What is
the relative prevalence of these various categories across the universe (e.g., are
there more artificial minds than insects or vice versa)? And what sort of regime
should we expect to prevail in the universe over very long timeframes (e.g., will
the universe come to be dominated by rational agents who successfully identify
and pursue the good, or by a Malthusian swamp of vast numbers of beings
barely eking out a miserable existence)? It seems clear to me, therefore, that
there is room for substantial uncertainty here as well, and that this uncertainty
includes (with substantial probability) both positive and negative possibilities.
To see how easily we get large-tailed background uncertainty from this sort
of Fermi-style reasoning: Suppose that my probability distribution over average
welfare is a standard Gaussian distribution (i.e, a Gaussian distribution with a
mean of 0 and a scale parameter/standard deviation of 1), with a PDF g, where
the standard deviation of g is interpreted as, say, the total amount of welfare in
a relatively happy human life. Since Gaussian distributions are extremely thin-
tailed, this represents an very modest degree of uncertainty. And suppose I am
certain that there are at least ten billion morally statused beings in the universe,
and that above that threshold, my credence is cut in half with each doubling
of the population—that is, I consider a population of between n and 2n beings
twice as probable as a population between 2n and 4n, which it turn is twice as
probable as a population between 4n and 8n, and so on. Thus I have credence
.5 that the universe contains between 10 billion and 20 billion morally statused
beings, credence .25 that it contains between 20 and 40 billion, credence .125
that it contains between 40 and 80 billion, and so on. More precise, suppose
the probability I assign to the universe having a total population of exactly
n is given by f(n) = 6pi2(n+1−1010)2 .
30 Finally, suppose the population of the
30Since there can only be whole numbers of sentient beings, this is a probability mass
function rather than a probability density function—the domain of f is the natural numbers,
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universe and the average welfare level per sentient being are independent.
Both these distributions strike me as enormously overconfident. Neverthe-
less, even these very modest assumptions generate background uncertainty with
two heavier-than-exponential tails.
Let β be the PDF of my background uncertainty, which can be expressed as
follows.
β(x) =
∞∑
n=1010
f(n)g(
x
n
)
Now, consider the relationship between β(x) and β(2x)—that is, between
the probability that the world contains some arbitrary amount of total welfare
(either positive or negative) and the probability that it contains twice that much
welfare. In any scenario where the total amount of welfare in the world is x,
there is a population of n and an average welfare level of xn . One way for the
world to contain a total welfare of 2x, then, is for it to have a an average welfare
level of xn but a population of 2n. That is:
∀x
(
β(2x) ≥ β(x)×
∞∑
n=1010
f(2n)
)
The upshot is that there is some constant c (in this case, slightly less than .5)
such that ∀x(β(2x) ≥ cβ(x)), meaning that β is heavier-than-exponential in
both tails.
The most serious objection I can see to the preceding line of argument is
that the universe, and the number of morally statused beings it contains, may
well be infinite rather than finite (see for instance Knobe et al. (2006), Carroll
(2017)). I will, unfortunately, have little to say about this objection. I take
it for granted that the true axiology (evaluative ranking of worlds) can make
non-trivial comparisons between infinite worlds, so that even if we were certain
that the universe was infinite, we could still be uncertain about its overall value
(even if its possible values could no longer be represented by real numbers). But
there is as yet no agreement on how to extend standard axiologies to infinite
worlds.31 And how (if at all) we extend the arguments in this paper to that
context will depend very much on which infinite axiology we adopt.
Perhaps more to the point (though no more satisfying) is the fact that ex-
pectational reasoning is, if anything, more threatened by infinite worlds than
stochastic dominance reasoning, so even if the arguments of this paper suffer in
an infinitary context, this is not likely to generate much support for expecta-
tionalism over SDTR.
The third and final argument for large-tailed background uncertainty is
the simplest: When I am uncertain which of several probability distributions
best characterizes some phenomenon, the resulting “mixture distribution” (the
probability-weighted average of the distributions over which I’m uncertain) in-
herits the tail properties of the heaviest distribution in the mixture: The further
out we go in the tails of the mixture distribution, the more the heaviest-tailed
distributions dominate the probability-weighted sum. So, suppose I am unsure
and f(n) yields a probability (of a population of n), rather than an integrand of probability.
31For some of the many extant proposals, see for instance Vallentyne and Kagan (1997),
Mulgan (2002), Bostrom (2011), and Arntzenius (2014).
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what probability distribution over background payoffs is justified by my evi-
dence, or that I assign credence to several different physical theories or models
of the world that imply different objective probability distributions over back-
ground payoffs. As long as I assign any positive credence to any distribution
with exponential or heavier tails, the resulting background prospect will itself
have exponential or heavier tails. The hypothesis that the correct objective
or evidential probability distribution over, say, the size of the universe should
have exponential or heavier tails pretty clearly merits at least some positive
credence. And this alone essentially guarantees large-tailed background uncer-
tainty for agents who assign normative weight to aggregate consequences. At
the very least, this argument from uncertainty puts the burden of proof on the
opponent of large-tailed background uncertainty to provide an argument for
thinner-than-exponential tails that is compelling enough to set our credence in
large-tailed hypotheses to zero.32
As I’ve already suggested, the case for large-tailed background uncertainty
doesn’t only apply to agents who are out-and-out aggregative consequentialists,
i.e., who measure the choiceworthiness of their options exclusively by the total
amount of value in the resulting world. It is sufficient that aggregative conse-
quentialist considerations make an additive contribution to the choiceworthiness
of an option. In this case, the agent’s background uncertainty will still have the
same shape as is would if she attached normative weight only to aggregate con-
sequences (unless there other, non-consequentialist sources of background un-
certainty; and as long as these other sources don’t systematically anti-correlate
with and hence offset the consequentialist sources, it seems that they would only
further spread out the background prospect further). The non-consequentialist
considerations will be captured mainly or entirely by the simple prospects of the
agent’s options. Of course, depending on the probabilities and choiceworthiness
values of these non-consequentialist considerations, they might make stochastic
dominance relationships among the agent’s options less likely—in particular, if
they introduce many very small probabilities of very large positive or negative
payoffs. But even if one assigns very little weight to aggregative consequences,
relative to other kinds of normative considerations (as compared, say, to the
relative weights given by commonsense moral intuition), the weight of ordinary
non-consequentialist considerations is still likely to be small relative to the scale
parameter of one’s uncertainty about the total amount of welfare in the universe.
For instance, if one’s background uncertainty follows a Laplace distribution, its
scale parameter presumably should be at least on the order of millions of happy
lives, if not billions. And only the most extreme deontological views assign ordi-
nary non-consequentialist considerations a weight anywhere close to that order
of magnitude.
32This last argument in particular suggests to me that the phenomenon of large-tailed back-
ground uncertainty, and the significance of the results in §5, can generalize well beyond agents
who assign normative weight to aggregative consequentialist considerations. But vindicating
this claim would require a much lengthier argument that I won’t attempt to spell out here.
34
7 The rational significance of background un-
certainty
An initially counterintuitive feature of the arguments in the last two sections
is their implication that what an agent rationally ought to do in a given choice
situation can depend on her uncertainties with respect to seemingly irrelevant
features of the world. To put the point as sharply as possible, whether I am
rationally required, for instance, to take a risky action that could save two lives
or cause one death, with equal probabilities, can depend on my uncertainty
about the existence, numbers, and welfare of sentient beings in distant galaxies,
perhaps outside the observable universe, with whom I will never and can never
interact, on whom my choices have no effect, and whose existence, numbers,
welfare, etc, make no difference to the local effects of my choices.
Surprising and counterintuitive though this conclusion may seem, however,
I believe that it is fully intelligible on reflection. In this section, I will try to
motivate intuitively the idea that background uncertainty can be relevant to
what an agent rationally ought to do. To do this, I’ll first describe a very simple
case in which the relevance of background uncertainty is (I think) intuitively
clear, then argue that our conclusions in this simple case generalize to more
complex cases.
Here, then, is the simple case:
Methuselah’s Choice Methuselah is, and knows himself to be, the only sen-
tient being in the universe (past, present, or future). He came into ex-
istence finitely long ago, and has so far been in a neutral state. He now
faces a choice—the only choice he will ever make. He can choose either
O1, which yields 100 years of happy life for sure, or O2, which yields 1500
years of happy life with probability .1, or zero years of happy life with
probability .9.
If we assume that these years of happy life are the only potential source
of value or disvalue in the universe, it seems intuitively obvious to me that
Methuselah is rationally permitted to make either choice. Even if he is rationally
required to satisfy the VNM axioms, say, these alone do not tell him which option
to choose. And long run arguments for expectationalism are irrelevant as well,
since Methuselah knows for certain that there is no long run.
But now suppose that we add some background uncertainty:
Methuselah’s Box In addition to Methuselah, Methuselah’s universe contains
a magic box, which contains a real-number generator. Methuselah will
make his choice between O1 and O2 at time t. Then, at time t
′, the
random number generator inside the box will generate a number, from a
Cauchy distribution centered at zero with a scale parameter of 10,000, and
open itself to reveal this number to Methuselah. In addition to the payoff
from his choice, Methuselah will receive a number of happy or unhappy
life-years equal to the number generated by the box.
(To avoid complicating our intuitions with comparisons between happy and
unhappy years of life, assume that whatever total payoff Methuselah receives,
it will come in the form of exclusively happy life-years or exclusively unhappy
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life-years. Thus, for instance, if he receives +1500 from his choice and −2000
from his box, he will experience 500 years of unhappy life. If he gets +1500
from his choice and −200 from his box, he will experience 1300 years of happy
life.)
In virtue of Methuselah’s uncertainty about the payoff he will receive from
his box, O2 now stochastically dominates O1—assuming only that Methuselah
regards happy life as better than unhappy life, less unhappy life as better than
more, and more happy life as better than less, and believes that an option result-
ing in a better outcome is more choiceworthy, all else being equal. (“Betterness”
and “choiceworthiness,” once again, can be understood as either dependent on
or independent of Methuselah’s motivational states.) And for precisely this rea-
son, it now seems intuitively clear that Methuselah rationally ought to choose
O2. Absent the uncertainty that his box introduces, Methuselah could have
reasoned his way to choosing O1 on the grounds that if he chooses O1, he will
certainly receive at least 100 years of happy life, while if he choose O2, he very
probably will not. And there is no compelling defeater to this reasoning, pro-
vided that (as I claimed above) there is no compelling argument in this case for
risk-neutrally maximizing expected happy life-years. But once we introduce the
box, there is a compelling defeater to the original justification for O1: First,
Methuselah is not guaranteed to experience at least 100 years of happy life if
he chooses O1. Second, in fact, he has a better chance of experiencing at least
100 years of happy life if he chooses O2. And third, the same is true for any
other possible payoff : Whatever payoff he chooses to focus on, Methuselah has a
better chance of a payoff at least that good if he choose O2. Thus, Methuselah’s
background uncertainty gives him conclusive grounds for choosing O2.
But what does this have to do with more ordinary choice situations? Let’s
generalize the lesson of Methuselah’s case in two steps. First, consider an agent
Alice who is certain that classical, hedonistic utilitarianism is true, and faces a
choice between O1, which will with certainty do an amount of good equivalent
to 100 years of happy life, or O2, which yields 1500 happy-life-year-equivalents
with probability .1, and has no effect with probability .9. And suppose that
Alice’s beliefs about the total amount of value in the universe, apart from the
effects of her present choice, are described by a Cauchy distribution centered at
zero, and with a scale parameter of 10,000 happy-life-year-equivalents.
Because Alice is a classical hedonistic utilitarian, her choice situation is in
every relevant respect equivalent to Methuselah’s: It makes no difference, from
a classical utilitarian perspective, whether the welfare at stake is the agent’s
own, whether the possible payoffs all pertain to a single being or are distributed
across many different beings, whether they are near to the agent in space or
time, and so on. If there were nothing of moral significance in the universe
apart from the simple payoffs of Alice’s choice between O1 and O2, there would
be no rationally decisive justification for choosing O2. But just as in the case
of Methuselah, by making O2 stochastically dominant over O1, her background
uncertainty gives her just such a decisive justification.
But does this line of reasoning only apply to rigorously orthodox utilitarians,
who are committed to universal impartiality and the interpersonal fungibility
of welfare? No. All that our reasoning in the cases of Methuselah and Alice
really depended on was the fungibility of choiceworthiness, which is a concep-
tual truth so trivial that it is hardly worth stating. Suppose that Bob accepts
a commonsense, pluralistic theory of practical reasons, and suppose he faces a
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choice between O1 and O2, where O1 has a simple prospect of {〈100, 1〉} and
O2 has a simple prospect of {〈1500, .9〉, 〈0, .1〉}. And suppose his background
uncertainty is a Cauchy distribution centered at zero with a scale parameter
of 10,000. Once again, of course, for any degree of choiceworthiness, O2 gives
Bob a better chance of performing an action at least that choiceworthy than
does O1. The difference is that that the various ways in which, say, O2 might
turn out to have a degree of choiceworthiness greater than or equal to 500 are
much more complex and qualitatively diverse in the case of Bob than in the
cases of Methuselah or the case of Alice. This makes the force of the stochastic
dominance argument harder to see, but not any weaker. Just as, for a classical
utilitarian, any world that contains the equivalent of x happy life years in net
hedonic value is equally good regardless of how that welfare is distributed across
time, space, or sentient beings (and any world that contains more than x happy
life-year equivalents is better), so on any normative theory, any option with a
choiceworthiness of x is just as choiceworthy as any other (and any option with
choiceworthiness greater than x is better), no matter how complex or multi-
farious the considerations that contribute to determining an option’s degree of
choiceworthiness. The case of Bob is therefore no different, from the standpoint
of rational choice, than the case of Methuselah.33
8 Two modest conclusions
In the last three sections, I have shown that in the presence of sufficient back-
ground uncertainty, stochastic dominance recovers many of the ordinary conclu-
sions of expectational reasoning while avoiding unwanted Pascalian conclusions;
I have argued that at least some agents are or ought to be in the requisite state
of background uncertainty; and I have defended the initially counterintuitive
claim that background uncertainty is relevant to rational choice and should be
included in the decision-theoretic representation of choice situations.
But what larger conclusions should we draw from this line of argument? In
this section, I describe two relatively moderate conclusions we might draw. In
the next section, I make the case for my own more ambitious conclusion.
8.1 A decision theory for consequentialists?
In recent years, there has been a great deal of activity at the intersection of ethics
and decision theory, and considerable interest in the idea of “moral/ethical deci-
sion theory”—a decision theory distinct from expected utility theory that either
governs ethical decision-making in general or serves as the decision-theoretic
component of a particular ethical theory. Along these lines, the results in §5
might be seen as laying the foundation for a “utilitarian decision theory,” anal-
ogous to and in the spirit of recent attempts to develop a “deontological de-
cision theory” (Colyvan et al., 2010; Isaacs, 2014; Lazar, 2017a,b). Though I
have made some attempt to argue that the assumptions on which these results
33This is not to deny, of course, that some normative theories—e.g., those that don’t assign
any significant weight to aggregate consequences—may fail to generate the kind of background
uncertainty that these cases require. The point is only that, if a normative theory does
generate this sort of background uncertainty, then we should find the rational relevance of
that background uncertainty just an unproblematic as it is in the stripped-down case of
Methuselah.
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depend generalize well beyond purely consequentialist normative theories like
classical utilitarianism, they are clearly easiest to justify in the context of such a
theory. The assumption of additive separability between simple and background
payoffs is trivial in the context of a theory like classical utilitarianism (more to-
tal welfare is always better than less, and the total welfare that results from
an option can be expressed as the sum of, say, total welfare inside the agent’s
future light cone and total welfare outside her future light cone), the indepen-
dence assumptions concerning background payoffs are highly plausible (and, I
hope to show in future work, can be considerably weakened), and I have argued
in §6 that assumptions of large tails and a reasonably large scale parameter are
very plausible as well. So we might conclude from the preceding arguments that
stochastic dominance is the right decision theory for classical utilitarians and
other aggregative consequentialists. Or more conservatively, we might simply
conclude that stochastic dominance and the presence of background uncertainty
gives aggregative consequentialists conclusive rational justification for choos-
ing options whose simple prospects maximize expected objective value in most
ordinary choice situations, even if they are also subject to decision-theoretic
requirements besides stochastic dominance.
8.2 An add-on to standard decision theory?
Generalizing a little further, we can understand the results in §5 as an add-on
to axiomatic expectationalism: At least for some agents in some choice situ-
ations, the presence of background uncertainty imposes strict constraints on
the agent’s preferences over simple prospects, requirements that don’t follow
from the standard decision-theoretic axioms in the absence of background un-
certainty. Specifically, agents are rationally required to rank simple prospects
in a way that very closely approximates maximizing the expectation of a partic-
ular, privileged cardinal choiceworthiness assignment—namely, the assignment
that satisfies additive separability between simple and background payoffs.34
Plausibly, this privileged cardinalization will match the natural cardinal
structure of the phenomena in the world to which the agent attaches normative
weight. For instance, suppose for simplicity that I am just concerned with the
number of happy lives in the universe as a whole, that my simple payoffs consist
of happy lives in my future light cone, and my background payoffs consist of
happy lives outside my future light cone. Assuming that I always prefer an over-
all payoff involving more happy lives to one involving fewer, any cardinalization
of my ranking of payoffs that satisfies additive separability must be an affine
transformation of total number of happy lives. (This follows simply from the
facts that this cardinalization satisfies additive separability and that if there is
such a cardinalization, it is unique up to positive affine transformation.) Or sup-
34Remember that this assignment, if it exists, is unique up to positive affine transformation.
So any non-affine transformation of this privileged cardinalization will break the additive sepa-
rability condition on which the results in §5 depend. More to the point, stochastic dominance
relations only depend on the ordinal ranking of payoffs, so the same stochastic dominance
relations will hold under a positive monotone but non-affine transformation of the privileged
cardinal choiceworthiness assignment, but these will no longer be accurately described by the
Upper and Lower Bound Theorems, and so we cannot say, for instance, that any option that
is “sufficiently expectationally better” than some alternative (in the sense given by the Upper
Bound Theorem) according to the transformed cardinal choiceworthiness assignment will be
stochastically dominant.
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pose I only care about my lifetime income, and I always prefer a larger income
to a smaller income. The only way to represent this ordinal preference relation
by a sum of cardinal values assigned to simple and background payoffs is via
a cardinal value assignment that is an affine transformation of monetary value.
Assuming that other values behave in the same way, maximizing the expecta-
tion of an additively separable choiceworthiness function means (at least when
other, non-value-based considerations are not in play) maximizing the expecta-
tion of objective value. So the greater my background uncertainty about the
total quantity of value that will result from my available options, the more often
stochastic dominance alone will constrain me to choose options whose simple
prospects are expectationally best, with respect to the natural cardinal scale for
measuring value.
To put the point a little differently, the presence of sufficient background
uncertainty, combined with the standard axioms, lets us derive strong decision-
theoretic conclusions merely from the agent’s ranking of payoffs (or, equivalently,
of options under certainty), without needing any information or making any as-
sumptions about her ranking of uncertain prospects. Since the standard axioms
already imply that agents should reject stochastically dominated options, what
is doing the distinctive work here is not stochastic dominance per se, but rather
the recognition of background payoffs as something that needs to be included in
the representation of choice situations, and the claim that many agents are (or
should be) in a state of fairly significant background uncertainty. Given some
ranking of overall payoffs, an agent who satisfies (say) the VNM axioms may
maximize the expectation of any utility function that is monotonically increas-
ing with respect to that ranking. Nevertheless, when we look at her choices
among simple prospects, she will almost always choose the option that is ex-
pectationally best according to a particular cardinal choiceworthiness function,
which can be specified without any information about the agent’s preferences
over uncertain prospects (beyond the assumption that they satisfy VNM).35
35There is another closely related way in which the results in §5 might be welcome news
to standard decision theorists: They lend support to the already widely recognized idea that,
if we adopt a “grand world” rather than a “small world” framing of decision problems and
account for the level of background risk or uncertainty that the grand world context implies
for real-world agents, non-standard decision theories that permit non-neutral risk attitudes
are likely to end up in very close practical agreement with standard decision theory. For
existing arguments to this effect, see for instance Thoma and Weisberg (2017) and Thoma
(forthcoming). The existing literature tends to assume that the grand world context generates
background uncertainty with only bounded support or thin tails, and that the agent’s risk
attitude comes from some narrowly constrained class (e.g., a transformation f : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1]
on cumulative probabilities of payoffs ≥ x of the form f(x) = xc for some constant c). But I
have argued that once we account for the normative weight of ethical considerations, consid-
erably greater background uncertainty is warranted. And insofar as large-tailed background
uncertainty causes expectationally superior options (specifically, options that are expecta-
tionally superior relative to a particular, privileged cardinalization) to become stochastically
dominant, it constrains the implications of a much wider class of risk attitudes: viz., any risk
attitude that satisfies stochastic dominance. (In the context of transformations on cumulative
probabilities, this means any transformation f : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] that is strictly increasing.)
One possible generalization of the arguments in this paper is to explore what “almost
stochastic dominance” relations arise in the context of background prospects that are thinner-
than-exponential or small-scale (including background prospects with bounded support). For
instance, one might consider the idea that rationality comes in degrees, and that when one
option is very close to stochastically dominating another, even if the nearly-dominated option
is not fully irrational or rationally prohibited, it is nearly so, and a less rational choice than
the option that nearly-dominates it. This line of thought might offer a partial vindication
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As I promised in §3, I haven’t given any novel arguments for rejecting any
of the axioms of standard decision theory, except by showing that we can derive
robust decision-theoretic conclusions without appeal to those axioms. If you
are inclined to accept the standard axioms, therefore, it is natural to adopt this
“add-on” interpretation of the arguments in the last three sections, as supple-
menting rather than replacing the implications of axiomatic decision theory.
9 Stochastic dominance as a general decision the-
ory
I want to advance a more ambitious conclusion, however: namely, that SDTR
rather than expectationalism is the true theory of rational choice under uncer-
tainty (i.e., that rejecting stochastically dominated options is a sufficient as well
as a necessary condition for rational choice). My argument, in short, in this:
The major disadvantage of SDTR relative to expectationalism is its apparent
failure to place plausible constraints on risk attitudes.36 On the other hand,
SDTR has a number of advantages over expectationalism, some of which we’ve
already seen and others of which will be introduced in this section. These ad-
vantages are significant enough that, if stochastic dominance can in fact recover
constraints on our risk attitudes that are as strong, or nearly as strong, as our
decision-theoretic intuitions demand, then it deserves to be treated as a serious
competitor to expectationalism.
We have already seen two possible advantages of SDTR: First, it seems to
rest on stronger a priori foundations than expectationalism. Second, even while
recovering constraints on our risk attitudes, it can still avoid the implausible
implications of primitive expectationalism in Pascalian choice situations. In
this section, I will briefly survey some other cases where SDTR outperforms
primitive and/or axiomatic expectationalism. Some of these are still problem
cases for SDTR, where it is not obvious what stochastic dominance reasoning
will imply or where it gives us less guidance than we would like. But in all
of them, SDTR delivers better answers than expectationalism seems capable of
providing.37
of traditional long-run arguments for primitive expectationalism: Setting aside any other
sources of background uncertainty, a long run of future choices (or past choices whose outcome
is still unknown) that each yield independent simple prospects with bounded support will
collectively generate background uncertainty with respect to an agent’s present choice. Since
the background prospect generated by this sort of long run has only bounded support, it
will not generally be enough to generate full stochastic dominance, but if its support is wide
enough, it might get the expectationally superior option very “close” to stochastic dominance
over its alternatives. I’m not yet sure how promising this line of thought is, however, in part
because there is for the moment no well-accepted notion of “almost stochastic dominance” or
“nearness” to stochastic dominance in terms of which the argument could be stated.
36Another possible worry is that SDTR requires level-comparability rather than unit-
comparability across states. As we will see below, this may be an advantage, since it al-
lows SDTR to generalize to cases where payoffs are ranked ordinally rather than cardinally
in each state, meaning that unit comparisons and expectational reasoning are impossible.
But it may also be a disadvantage, since where payoffs in each state are cardinally mea-
surable, level-comparability is a strictly stronger requirement than unit-comparability. I set
this worry aside, since to discuss it usefully would take us too far afield. But I think that
level-comparability across states is generally plausible, at least in the context of aggregative
consequentialist normative theories.
37It is worth saying briefly where SDTR stands relative to the standard axioms of axiomatic
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In this section, I will mainly ignore the effects of background uncertainty.
Incorporating background uncertainty into each of the cases I survey below is
(at least) a paper unto itself, and my aim is only to illustrate that there is a
broad range of problem cases in which SDTR outperforms expectationalism.38
9.1 Infinite payoffs
The simplest problem cases for expectational decision theory are those involv-
ing possibilities of infinite positive and/or negative payoffs, as exemplified by
Pascal’s Wager (Pascal, 1669). In these cases, expectational reasoning deliv-
ers either implausible advice or no advice at all. On the other hand, even in
the absence of background uncertainty, stochastic dominance can often deliver
plausible verdicts in these cases.
Case 1: Pascal’s Wager (Costly)
O1 {〈10, 1〉}
O2 {〈9, .99〉, 〈+∞, .01〉}
Expectationalism implies that O2 is rationally required. SDTR implies that
either option is rationally permissible.
Case 2: Pascal’s Wager (Costless)
O1 {〈10, 1〉}
O2 {〈10, .99〉, 〈+∞, .01〉}
Both SDTR and expectationalism imply that O2 is rationally required.
Case 3: Pascal’s Wager (Regular)
O1 {〈10, .99〉, 〈+∞, .01〉}
O2 {〈10, .90〉, 〈+∞, .10〉}
expectationalism. This question is slightly complicated because there are two different kinds
of rankings of options associated with SDTR that we might compare to the standard axioms:
(i) the stochastic dominance ordering itself (i.e., the partial order sd) and (ii) the various
completions (or partial completions) of sd that SDTR permits an agent to adopt as her sub-
jective preferences or choice dispositions. Taking the VNM axioms (completeness, transitivity,
continuity, and independence) as a point of reference, the stochastic dominance ordering sd
violates completeness and continuity, but satisfies transitivity and independence. If we think
of SDTR as requiring agents to adopt some completion of sd as their subjective preference
ordering, rather than to simply adopt sd as their preference ordering (and choose freely
among the options in a given choice situation that are not stochastically dominated), things
are a bit more complicated. It is natural to require that an agent’s completion of sd satisfy
transitivity. But in the course of completing sd, she may form some preferences that violate
independence. So the result will be a strict ordering of options that must satisfy completeness
and transitivity, but need not satisfy continuity or independence.
38As far as I have been able to discover, the presence of background uncertainty only
ever favors stochastic dominance (in particular, because background uncertainty can only
ever generate new stochastic dominance relations among options as identified by their simple
prospects, never undo existing relationships (Pomatto et al., 2018, pp. 2–3)) and only ever
disfavors expectationalism (in particular, by generating undefined expectations), though of
course this is an imprecise and speculative claim in need of further support.
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Expectationalism implies that the options are equally good, and hence are both
rationally permissible. SDTR implies O2 is rationally required.
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Case 4: Pascal’s Wager (Angry God)
O1 {〈−∞, .09〉, 〈9, .99〉, 〈+∞, .01〉}
O2 {〈−∞, .01〉, 〈9, .99〉, 〈+∞, .09〉}
The expected choiceworthiness of both option is undefined, so insofar as expec-
tationalism yields any practical conclusions at all, it implies that both options
are rationally permissible. SDTR implies that O2 is rationally required.
9.2 The St. Petersburg game
In the St. Petersburg game (Bernoulli, 1738), you are offered the chance to pay
some finite price for a lottery ticket that pays +1 with probability 12 , +2 with
probability 14 , +4 with probability
1
8 , and so on. Since the ticket has infinite
expected value, expectationalism implausibly implies that you should be willing
to pay any finite price for it. Once again, SDTR can do better.
Case 5: St. Petersburg
O1 {〈1000, 1〉}
O2 {〈1, .5〉, 〈2, .25〉, 〈4, .125〉, ...}
Expectationalism implies that O2 is rationally required. SDTR implies that
both options are rationally permissible.
Case 6: St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg +1
O1 {〈1000, 1〉}
O2 {〈1, .5〉, 〈2, .25〉, 〈4, .125〉, ...}
O3 {〈2, .5〉, 〈3, .25〉, 〈5, .125〉, ...}
Expectationalism implies that O2 and O3 are both rationally permissible, but
O1 is rationally forbidden. SDTR implies that O1 and O3 are both rationally
permissible, but O2 is rationally forbidden.
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39SDTR thus furnishes a simple reply to the objections to Pascal’s Wager raised in Ha´jek
(2003), while also allowing that one is not always rationally required to accept the Wager.
40Lauwers and Vallentyne (2016) object to stochastic dominance reasoning based on a St.
Petersburg-like case. Their case involves two St. Petersburg lotteries, SP1 and SP2, with anti-
correlated payoffs (such that SP1 yields the minimum payoff in exactly those states where SP2
does not, and vice versa), along with a slightly improved St. Petersbury lottery W+. Although
W+ stochastically dominates both SP1 and SP2, it turns out that the lottery SP1+SP2
2
,
which yields the average of SP1’s and SP2’s payoff in each state, statewise dominates (and
hence stochastically dominates)W+. As I understand their argument, Lauwers and Vallentyne
take it as an objection to stochastic dominance reasoning that there can be triples of options
Oi/j/k such that Ok sd Oi, Ok sd Oj , but Oi+Oj2 sd Ok (which implies that
Oi+Oj
2
sd
Oi and
Oi+Oj
2
sd Oj). The thought, I take it, is that it’s implausible to treat an option
that averages the payoffs of two other options as strictly better than both of the options it
averages.
As far as I can see, though, this is simply a case of hasty generalization from finite to
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9.3 The Pasadena game
The Pasadena game (Nover and Ha´jek, 2004) is a variation of the St. Petersburg
game, in which there are infinitely many possible negative payoffs as well as in-
finitely many possible positive payoffs, the probability-weighted sum of positive
payoffs is infinite, and the probability-weighted sum of negative payoffs is infi-
nite. This means that the expected choiceworthiness of the Pasadena game is
not infinite but undefined.41 In the original version of the Pasadena game, we
toss a fair coin until it lands heads, and the payoff of the game is given by the
function (−1)n−1 × 2nn .
We can say more or less the same things about the Pasadena game as we
said about the St. Petersburg game.
Case 7: Pasadena
O1 {〈1000, 1〉}
O2 {〈2, .5〉, 〈−2, .25〉, 〈 83 , .125〉,−4, .0625〉, ...}
Here, SDTR and expectationalism agree: The expectation of O1 is undefined,
and so incomparable with the expectation of O2, so expectationalism implies
that both options are permissible. SDTR straightforward implies that both
options are permissible, since neither is stochastically dominant.
But now consider...
Case 8: Pasadena, Altadena
O1 {〈1000, 1〉}
O2 {〈2, .5〉, 〈−2, .25〉, 〈 83 , .125〉,−4, .0625〉, ...}
O3 {〈3, .5〉, 〈−1, .25〉, 〈 113 , .125〉,−3, .0625〉, ...}
Here, since both O2 and O3 have undefined expectations, expectationalism im-
plies that neither of them is comparable with O1, and so (presumably) all three
options are rationally permissible. SDTR, on the other hand, yields the in-
tuitively correct verdict that O1 and O3 are rationally permissible but O2 is
not.
infinite cases. The real lesson of Lauwers and Vallentyne’s case is that, when two options
have infinite expectations, averaging their payoffs can result in an improvement over both
options. This is wholly plausible when we consider the results: SP1 and SP2 each have a
simple prospect of {〈2, .5〉, 〈4, .25〉, 〈8, .125〉, ...}, whereas SP1+SP2
2
has a simple prospect of
{〈3, .5〉, 〈5, .25〉, 〈9, .125〉, ...}. The result of averaging the two anti-correlated St. Petersburg
lotteries, in other words, is St. Petersburg +1. As long as we accept that this is an improvement
over St. Petersburg, which we should, Lauwers and Valletyne’s case is not a reason to reject
stochastic dominance reasoning.
41Strictly, the expectation is given by an infinite series of probability-weighted payoffs whose
sum can conditionally converge to any finite or infinite value, depending on how the terms
are ordered. For now, I take it for granted that there is no privileged ordering of possible
payoffs, and so expected choiceworthiness is defined only when the probability-weighted sum
of payoffs converges absolutely. For discussion of possible extensions of expectational decision
theory to handle cases like the Pasadena game, see for instance Colyvan and Ha´jek (2016) and
Lauwers and Vallentyne (2016). I return to the problem of Pasadena-like cases, and point out
a limitation of these approaches, in §9.7 below.
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9.4 Ordinality and lexicality
Philosophers have recently begun paying attention to the decision-theoretic
questions that arise when an agent is uncertain not only about the empirical
state of the world but also about basic normative principles.42 As has been noted
in this literature (e.g. by Sepielli (2010) and MacAskill (2016)), a major difficulty
for extending standard expectational decision theory to this “metanormative”
context is that some normative theories appear to give only ordinal rankings of
options, which cannot be multiplied by probabilities to compute expectations
and which expectational reasoning is therefore unable to handle. This has led to
the suggestion (e.g. in MacAskill (2014)) that fundamentally different decision
procedures may be needed to handle different categories of normative theory.
Stochastic dominance reasoning, however, can handle both ordinal and cardinal
contexts, and may therefore offer a more unified theory of rational choice than
expectationalism, once we take account of normative uncertainty. As a simple il-
lustration, consider the following case, where Roman numerals represent ordinal
ranks, with larger numerals representing greater degrees of choiceworthiness.
Case 9: Ordinal Risk
O1 {〈i, .3〉, 〈ii, .7〉}
O1 {〈ii, .7〉, 〈iii, .3〉}
Since the payoffs have only ordinal values, the expected choiceworthiness of both
options is of course undefined, so expectationalism implies that both options are
rationally permissible. SDTR implies that O2 is rationally required.
Another worry in the literature on moral uncertainty is that some normative
theories rank options lexically, either regarding certain categories of action as ab-
solutely required or prohibited (e.g., lying or intentionally killing the innocent),
or regarding certain categories of normative consideration as taking absolute
precedence over others (e.g., the welfare of the worse off over the welfare of the
better off). I won’t attempt to say how these cases should be represented, but
at least the simplest such cases (involving straightforwardly absolutist theories)
have the same structure as the “infinite payoff” cases described in §9.1, and so
favor SDTR over expectationalism.43
9.5 Incomparability and incompleteness
Another category of problem cases for standard decision theory involve incom-
pleteness. Normative incompleteness can take many different forms, e.g., an
incomplete ordinal ranking of options, total incomparability between differ-
ent dimensions of normative evaluation (e.g., moral vs. prudential value), or
rough/imprecise comparability between different categories of goods that give
rise to phenomena like “parity” (Chang, 2002). As with ordinality and lexi-
cality, the decision-theoretic problems associated with incompleteness are espe-
cially acute when we try to take account of an agent’s normative uncertainty:
42For a useful overview of this literature, see Bykvist (2017).
43For more on stochastic dominance reasoning in the context of uncertainty among merely-
ordinal and/or lexical normative theories, see Tarsney (2018) and Aboodi (unpublished).
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as MacAskill (2013) points out, an agent who has any non-zero credence in the-
ories that posit incomparability between the possible payoffs of her options is
likely to find that the expected choiceworthiness of those options is undefined.
Once again, however, stochastic dominance is able to recover various intuitive
verdicts in cases of incomparability that expectational reasoning cannot. For
instance, as Bader (2018) points out, stochastic dominance gives the right result
in the case of “opaque sweetening” introduced by Hare (2010). Here, a and b
represent incomparable payoffs, and a+ and b+ represent improved versions of
those payoffs, such that a+ is preferable to a but incomparable to b and b+, and
likewise for b+.
Case 10: Opaque Sweetening
O1 {〈a, .5〉, 〈b, .5〉}
O2 {〈a+, .5〉, 〈b+, .5〉}
Once again, the expected choiceworthiness of both options is undefined, so ex-
pectationalism implies that both options are rationally permissible. SDTR im-
plies that O2 is rationally required.
9.6 Infinite worlds
As I admitted in §6, the possibility that the world is infinite, and contains in-
finitely much positive and negative value regardless of my choices, complicates
my central line of argument. Generalizing the result from §5 to the infinitary
context requires a satisfactory axiology for infinite worlds, which we don’t yet
have. But at least on face, SDTR seems much better equipped than expecta-
tionalism to handle infinite worlds. The simplest axiological representation of
infinite worlds is given by the extended real number line (the reals, plus special
elements ∞ and −∞, ordered as you would expect). This is the worst case for
consequentialist ethical reasoning, since it implies that no finite difference we
can make to the world has any axiological effect. Nonetheless, even under this
gloomy supposition, SDTR is able to provide useful practical guidance, so long
as I have non-zero credence that the world is finite. Suppose, for instance, that
I am nearly certain that the world is infinite and contains either infinite positive
value or infinite negative value, but have some credence that it is finite, such
that my actions can make an axiological difference.
Case 11: Heaven or Hell
O1 {〈−∞, .45〉, 〈10, .1〉, 〈+∞, .45〉}
O2 {〈−∞, .01〉, 〈11, .1〉, 〈+∞, .09〉}
The expected choiceworthiness of both options is undefined, so expectationalism
implies that both options are rationally permissible. SDTR implies that O2 is
rationally required. This is of course just a simple illustration of a broader
point: If two options each carry the same probability of infinite positive value
and the same probability of negative value, then one stochastically dominates
the other just in case its finite prospect is stochastically dominant.
Things get tricker when we consider the more realistic possibility that the
world, being infinite, contains infinitely much of both positive and negative
45
value. Here it is not only the expectation but the cardinal value itself that is
undefined. However, if we are willing to treat ∞ −∞ as a special degree of
value, albeit one that is incomparable with any other finite or infinite degree of
value, then the same conclusion holds:
Case 12: Heaven + Hell
O1 {〈−∞, .05〉, 〈10, .1〉, 〈+∞, .05〉, 〈∞ −∞, .8〉}
O2 {〈−∞, .05〉, 〈11, .1〉, 〈+∞, .05〉, 〈∞ −∞, .8〉}
Here again, expectationalism is silent, while SDTR implies that O2 is ratio-
nally required. Given that −∞ < 10 < 11 < ∞ and ∞−∞ is incomparable
with all four of these values, it is still the case that, for any possible payoff, O2
offers at least an equal (and for some payoff, a strictly greater) probability of
payoff at least that desirable.44
Of course, the extended real number line gives a supremely unsatisfying ac-
count of the axiology of infinite worlds, and much ink has been spilled trying
to do better (see note 31). I won’t try to survey these accounts or describe
how stochastic dominance might interact with each of them. But I will point
out that, if the correct axiology allows us to make ordinal comparisons between
infinite worlds, then stochastic dominance reasoning will allow us to derive prac-
tical conclusions from uncertainty over those ordinal values. And if the correct
axiology lets us make ordinal but not cardinal comparisons (between some or
all pairs of infinite worlds), then SDTR is here again at an advantage over
expectationalism.45
Consider, for instance, a modified version of the ordinal case from §9.4, this
time with Roman numeral subscripts used to represent better and worse ordinal
ranks assigned to infinite worlds.
Case 13: Ordinal Heaven + Hell
O1 {〈10, .15〉, 〈15, .35〉, 〈(∞−∞)i, .15〉, 〈(∞−∞)ii, .35〉}
O2 {〈15, .35〉, 〈20, .15〉, 〈(∞−∞)ii, .35〉, 〈(∞−∞)iii, .15〉}
Once again, expectationalism is silent, while SDTR implies that O2 is the
uniquely rational choice.
9.7 Learning to live with incompleteness
Despite the results given in §5, it remains the case that SDTR is a formally
incomplete decision theory: for some pairs of options, it implies that neither
is rationally preferable to the other, nor are they rationally indifferent (in the
44One might be tempted to think that we should treat the probability assigned to ∞−∞
like pure Knightian uncertainty over the whole extended real number line, in which case we
could not say for instance that O2 offers a greater probability of a payoff at least as good as
11. But this would be a mistake: I am not uncertain whether ∞−∞ is greater than, less
than, or equal to 11. Rather, I am certain that the two values are incomparable.
45Cardinal comparisons have been treated as a desideratum in the infinite ethics literature
largely in order to accommodate expectational decision theory (e.g. in Bostrom (2011, pp.
21–22) and Arntzenius (2014, p. 37)). If the correct decision theory does not require cardinal
values, therefore, this might make it easier to find a satisfactory axiology for infinite worlds.
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sense that anything preferable to one is preferable to the other). We have just
seen several cases where SDTR yields exactly this verdict.
One might think that completeness is an important desideratum for a deci-
sion theory. For my own part, I don’t have this intuition even prima facie—it
seems perfectly plausible to me in many cases (even very simple cases like the
case of Methuselah before the introduction of his box), more than one option
is rationally permissible, and not as a result of exact and improbable equality.
But beyond the level of intuition, there is good theoretical reason to think that
we should abandon our dreams of decision-theoretic completeness: It has re-
cently been shown by Lauwers (2016) that completeness is incompatible with
other very strong desiderata in decision theory, once we allow for cases like the
Pasadena game in which expected choiceworthiness is undefined.46
Moreover, expectational decision theory may be at risk of a much greater
degree of incompleteness than SDTR. We have just seen a number of cases where
expectational reasoning fails to rank options that are ranked by SDTR. But one
point I haven’t yet made is that, if I am right that most or all agents should be
in a state of large-tailed background uncertainty about the choiceworthiness of
their options, then it is likely that at least for many agents, expectationalism
will be maximally incomplete in practice, yielding no comparisons whatsoever
between the options that real-world agents actually face: While exponential-
tailed distributions (like Laplace distributions) have well-defined moments and
hence yield expectations, any heavier-tailed distribution does not. Thus, for an
agent with heavy-tailed (i.e., heavier than exponential) background uncertainty,
then from the standpoint of expectational decision theory, every choice we face
is like a choice between versions of the Pasadena game.47 Thus, an alternative
to expectational decision theory may be even more urgently needed than we
might have thought.
10 Conclusion
I have argued that, at least for agents who give normative weight to the ag-
gregate consequences of their choices, stochastic dominance can effectively con-
strain risk attitudes, recovering many of the plausible implications of expecta-
tional reasoning in a novel and unexpected way. I’ve also argued that stochastic
dominance reasoning has a wide range of advantages over expectational reason-
ing. And I’ve suggested that these two facts together put SDTR in the running
46Specifically, Lauwers shows that any ranking of prospects that is transitive and weakly
independent (meaning that it ranks any two gambles that yield different payoffs in only finitely
many states according to their expectation over those states) must be either incomplete or
non-constructive (meaning in effect that it requires an infinite number of arbitrary choices
about how to rank particular pairs of options). It seems clear to me that transitivity, weak
independence, and non-arbitrariness are all stronger decision-theoretic desiderata than com-
pleteness, though I imagine that not everyone will share this judgment.
47Various attempts have been made in the recent literature to extend expectational deci-
sion theory to cases where standard expectations are undefined. But these extensions have
questionable a priori foundations (e.g., they generate well-defined expectations by requiring
that probability-weighted payoffs be summed in a particular order, where different orders of
summation would yield different results), and still can only cope with moderately heavy tails
before they too generate undefined expectations. For a useful overview and instance of these
recent efforts, see Lauwers and Vallentyne (2016).
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as a general theory of rational choice under uncertainty.48
Appendix
This appendix proves the Upper Bound Theorem from §5.3:
pos(Oj) + neg(Ok)
pos(Ok) + neg(Oj)
> rate(Oj , Ok, β)→ Oj sd Ok
Proof. The probability that option Oj yields a payoff ≥ x is equal to [i] the
probability that the background distribution β yields a background payoff ≥ x,
[ii] plus the probability that β yields a background payoff < x, but Oj yields a
positive simple payoff that results in a total payoff≥ x, [iii] minus the probability
β yields a background payoff ≥ x, but Oj yields a negative simple payoff that
results in a total payoff < x. Since we assume that the simple payoffs and
the background payoffs are independent, we can express terms [ii] and [iii] as
the sum over simple payoffs (of the appropriate sign) of the probability of that
simple payoff times the probability of a background payoff such that that simple
payoff would reverse the inequality with x. Formally:
Pr(Oj ≥ x) =
∫ ∞
x
β(y)dy +
∑
i:vji>0
pji
∫ x
x−vji
β(y)dy −
∑
i:vji<0
pji
∫ x+|vji |
x
β(y)dy
Therefore:
Pr(Oj ≥ x) > Pr(Ok ≥ x)
↔ ∫∞
x
β(y)dy+
∑
i:vji>0
pji
∫ x
x−vji β(y)dy−
∑
i:vji<0
pji
∫ x+|vji |
x
β(y)dy >
∫∞
x
β(y)dy+∑
i:vki >0
pki
∫ x
x−vki β(y)dy −
∑
i:vki <0
pki
∫ x+|vki |
x
β(y)dy
↔∑i:vji>0 pji ∫ xx−vji β(y)dy−∑i:vji<0 pji ∫ x+|vji |x β(y)dy >∑i:vki >0 pki ∫ xx−vki β(y)dy−∑
i:vki <0
pki
∫ x+|vki |
x
β(y)dy
↔∑i:vji>0 pji ∫ xx−vji β(y)dy+∑i:vki <0 pki ∫ x+|vki |x β(y)dy >∑i:vki >0 pki ∫ xx−vki β(y)dy+∑
i:vji<0
pji
∫ x+|vji |
x
β(y)dy
↔
∑
i:v
j
i
>0
pji
∫ x
x−vj
i
β(y)dy+
∑
i:vk
i
<0
pki
∫ x+|vki |
x
β(y)dy
∑
i:vk
i
>0
pki
∫ x
x−vk
i
β(y)dy+
∑
i:v
j
i
<0
pji
∫ x+|vj
i
|
x β(y)dy
> 1
The ratio of two bounded integrals of β, both within an interval [x1, x2],
cannot be greater than the ratio of their lengths times the ratio between the
maximum and minimum values of β over [x1, x2]. That is:
48For helpful discussion and/or comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to
Joe Carlsmith, Hilary Greaves, Tyler John, Daniel Kokotajlo, William MacAskill, Toby Ord,
Eric Pacuit, Luciano Pomatto, Stefan Riedener, Miriam Schoenfield, Philip Trammell, and
especially to Owen Cotton-Barratt and Teruji Thomas.
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∀h∀i

∫max({x,x−vj/kh })
min({x,x−vj/kh })
β(y)dy∫max({x,x−vj/ki })
min({x,x−vj/ki })
β(y)dy
<
v
j/k
h
v
j/k
i
× max
y,z∈[x−min(Oi,Oj),x+max(Oi,Oj)]
β(y)
β(z)

Therefore, from the biconditional
∑
i:v
j
i
>0
pji
∫ x
x−vj
i
β(y)dy+
∑
i:vk
i
<0
pki
∫ x+|vki |
x
β(y)dy
∑
i:vk
i
>0
pki
∫ x
x−vk
i
β(y)dy+
∑
i:v
j
i
<0
pji
∫ x+|vj
i
|
x β(y)dy
> 1↔ Pr(Oj ≥ x) > Pr(Ok ≥ x)
we can infer the conditional∑
i:vi>0
vip
j
i+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pki∑
i:vi>0
vipki+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pji
> maxy,z∈[x−min(Oi,Oj),x+max(Oi,Oj)]
β(y)
β(z) → Pr(Oj ≥
x) > Pr(Ok ≥ x)
Making the universal quantification explicit, we have:
∀x
(∑
i:vi>0
vip
j
i+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pki∑
i:vi>0
vipki+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pji
> maxy,z∈[x−min(Oi,Oj),x+max(Oi,Oj)]
β(y)
β(z) → Pr(Oj ≥ x) > Pr(Ok ≥ x)
)
We can distribute the universal quantifier over the conditional, since ∀x(ϕ→
ψ) ` ∀xϕ→ ∀xψ.
∀x(
∑
i:vi>0
vip
j
i+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pki∑
i:vi>0
vipki+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pji
> maxy,z∈[x−min(Oi,Oj),x+max(Oi,Oj)]
β(y)
β(z) ) →
∀x(Pr(Oj ≥ x) > Pr(Ok ≥ x))
In the antecedent of this conditional, x only occurs on the righthand side of
the inequality. So we can replace the quantifier in the antecedent with maxx.∑
i:vi>0
vip
j
i+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pki∑
i:vi>0
vipki+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pji
> maxx maxy,z∈[x−min(Oi,Oj),x+max(Oi,Oj)]
β(y)
β(z) →
∀x(Pr(Oj ≥ x) > Pr(Ok ≥ x))
The expression we thereby obtain on the righthand side of the antecedent is
equivalent to rate(Oj , Ok, β):
maxx maxy,z∈[x−min(Oi,Oj),x+max(Oi,Oj)]
β(y)
β(z) = maxy<range(Oi,Oj),x
β(x+y)
β(x) =
rate(Oi, Oj , β)
Therefore:∑
i:vi>0
vip
j
i+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pki∑
i:vi>0
vipki+
∑
i:vi<0
|vi|pji
> rate(Oi, Oj , β) → ∀x(Pr(Oj ≥ x) > Pr(Ok ≥
x))
From which, by definitional substitutions, we obtain:
pos(Oj)+neg(Ok)
pos(Ok)+neg(Oj)
> rate(Oi, Oj , β)→ Oj sd Ok)
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